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♣ "[T]his interplay between analysis and computers, to further our understanding of nature, has now become 
general practice. The importance of this interplay, which Ulam (1960) emphasized, and referred to as 
`synergetics', has been adopted to and adapted several research philosophies (Zabusky, 1981, Haken, 1983). 
However, the importance of the computer, and the lessons we are learning from it, may even exceed the 
importance anticipated by `synergeticists'." (Jackson, 1990,, pp. 264-5, italics added). 
♠ This author is eternally indebted to his first teacher in economics, Professor Björn Thalberg, whose own 
research (Thalberg, 19660), and lectures on macroeconomics, almost forty years ago, were the catalysts that 
encouraged him on a path of research that has always emphasized the power, necessity and versatility of 
simulational studies of nonlinear dynamical systems in economics. Abstract1
Lehtinen and Kuorikoski ([73]) question, provocatively, whether, in the con-
text of ￿ Computing the Perfect Model￿ , economists avoid - even positively abhor
- reliance on ￿ simulation￿ . We disagree with the mildly quali￿ed a¢ rmative an-
swer given by them, whilst agreeing with some of the issues they raise. However
there are many economic theoretic, mathematical (primarily recursion theoretic
and constructive) - and even some philosophical and epistemological - infelici-
ties in their descriptions, de￿nitions and analysis. These are pointed out, and
corrected; for, if not, the issues they raise may be submerged and subverted by
emphasis just on the unfortunate, but essential, errors and misrepresentations.
Keywords: Simulation, Computation, Computable, Analysis, Dynamics,
Proof, Algorithm
1We are eternally in debt to the spirit, the practice, the philosophy and methodology of
our late and beloved teacher and friend, Richard Goodwin, who underlined the importance of
computation and simulation in nonlinear, interdependent, multisectoral economic analysis in
almost all his professional writings and teaching (in particular ￿but not only ￿in, [45], [46],
[48], [49], [50]). More immediately, however, we are deeply grateful to our friend Joe McCauley
and our students, N. Dharmaraj, Kao Selda and V. Ragupathy, who have, each in his and her
own way, helped us strengthen our belief in the ￿ synergy￿ . Joe McCauley￿ s work in nonlinear
dynamics and ￿nancial market dynamics ￿ in the latter, he was following the tradition of
Maury Osborne ([98]) ￿ have been important inspiring sources for our work and belief in
the ￿ synergy￿ , in particular the signi￿cance he has increasingly come to attach to PoincarØ￿ s
￿ recurrence theorem￿([81], chapter 3 and [82]). This theorem, implicitly and explicitly, lies at
the heart of Fermi￿ s inspiration in formulating what came to be known, justly and famously, as
the Fermi-Pasta-Ulam Paradox ([37] and [36]) and ￿ The Genesis of Simulation in Dynamics￿
([165]). This ￿ paradox￿should be our paradigmatic ￿ case study￿ , to substantiate a belief in the
validity of an extended synergetics (between simulation, computation and analysis). However,
space limitations are a constraint for this good intention.
2"Tobin exclaimed at Nozick: ￿ There￿ s nothing more dangerous
than a philosopher who￿ s learned a little bit of economics.￿To which
Nozick immediately responded: ￿ Unless it￿ s an economist who hasn￿ t
learned any philosophy￿ ."
Hutchinson, [64], p. 187
"In what other way, if not simulation by a Turing machine,
can we understand the process of making free choices? By making
them, perhaps."
Nozick, [97], p.303; bold italics added.
31 A Preamble on Simulational Serendipities
"Mature as he was, she might yet be able to help him to the building
of the rainbow bridge2 that should connect the prose in us with the
passion. Without it we are meaningless fragments, half monks, half
beasts, unconnected arches that have never joined into a man."
E.M.Forster: Howard￿ s End, Chapter XXII (italics added)
The May-June, 2009, issue of the American Scientist (Vol. 97, No. 3) con-
tained, serendipitously, four ￿possibly ￿ve3 ￿articles on the fundamental role
played by simulations - in its synergetic interactions with theoretical analysis,
experiment, computation, prediction and dynamics ￿in macroeconomics ([60]),
physics ([105]), engineering ([101]4) and a ￿ revisit￿to the Limits to Growth report
([55]). In particular, the repository of simulation in the example of macroeco-
nomics by Brian Hayes, is an exemplary exposition of the Phillips Machine,
devised and constructed as an electro-mechanical-hydraulic analogue computing
machine, encapsulating early Keynesian Monetary Macrodynamics, and capable
of interacting with macroeconomic theory and even settling controversial the-
oretical debates decisively. The workings of the machine, entirely transparent,
were such that almost any nonlinear dynamical system, then current in macro-
economic theory, could have been exactly5 simulated, without any recourse to
2The phrase used by Dr Allan McRobie to refer to the Millennium Bridge ￿also referred
to as the Blade of Light (cf. [134]) ￿during a personal conversation with the ￿rst author, in
Cambridge, on 17th May, 2010. Dr Allan McRobie was instrumental is detecting the source
of the dramatic failure of the Millennium Bridge via an inspiring simulation study using
a home-made analogue device in his University laboratories at Cambridge. Velupillai had
gone to Cambridge to view a demonstration of the resurrected Phillips Machine, an analogue
computing machine devised by the famous economist A.W.H. Phillips to model, simulate and
study Keynesian Business Cycle Theories in policy contexts. The Phillips Machine, also known
as the MONIAC ￿clearly a play on the name given to the ￿rst, large-scale, digital computing
device, MANIAC ￿in Cambridge was resurrected single-handedly by Dr McRobie. Velupillai
had been educated with it as a computing tool for simulating Keynesian Nonlinear Multiplier-
Accelerator models by its ￿rst - and only ￿ economist custodian, Richard Goodwin, whose
theoretical work informed decisively the construction of the analogue computing machine by
Phillips ([102]).
3This is because the article on The Origin of Life in this issue of the American Scientist
([145]) traces the emergence of ￿ experimental research in origin-of-life studies￿in the analogue
device with which Harold Urey and Stanley Miller studied ￿via simulations of hypothetical
conditions satisfying the Oparin-Haldane hypothesis of chemical evolution ￿ the ￿ chemical
processes that might have occurred on the planet soon after its birth.￿ The ultimate method-
ological message of Tre￿l, Morowitz and Smith ￿the authors of The Origin of Life ￿appears
to be an intensive experimental research program tied to the development of the appropriate
theory, itself guided by experimental results. The experimental program, of studying ￿ com-
plex cooperative networks￿ , is, surely, through simulational studies of the fruitful interaction
of analogue experimental setups and digital computing methods.
4Most interestingly, Dr Petroski￿ s visit to Japan, which resulted in his fascinating article
on the Akashi Kaikyo Bridge, was sponsored by the Association for the Study of Failure
(Shippai Gakkai), as its Invited Speaker at their International Conference in November, 2008.
Needless to say, as economists we are only painfully aware - simulations or not - of the need
for such a society in economics!
5Subject, of course, to engineering precision constrains in the manufacture of the electrical,
4approximations or discretizations, normally required in a digital computer - un-
less, of course, continuous data was available (which was not) to exploit its ￿
the Phillips Machine￿ s ￿full analogue potential. Moreover, the machine was ca-
pable of displaying, in all its transparent detail, the propagation mechanisms of
policy and ￿ shocks￿ , whether monetary or ￿ real￿ , con￿rming and discon￿rming,
as the case may be, orthodox and non-orthodox propositions on policy and even
inculcating a sense of humility in the then emerging consensus on the feasibility
of what came to be known as ￿ne-tuning (see [4], in particular, §5, p. 108,
⁄). The Machine was also capable of generating surprises, a sine qua non of an
experimental device or design, in its interaction with theories that underpin and
interact with it. At the request of Nicholas Stern at the LSE, when attempts
were being made to resurrect one of their two Phillips Machines, Richard Good-
win wrote a memoir6 on his own experiences in working and teaching with it.
In a PS to the covering letter (dated 16 August 1991) he sent Stern, together
with the memoir, Goodwin noted as follows7:
"I was very pleased that Phillips had 2 machines in London and I
was able to show him (which he had doubted) that we could produce
aperiodic, ￿ chaotic￿ , motion with the two interconnected" (italics
added)
In other words, every desideratum speci￿ed, implicitly, explicitly and vaguely
by Lehtinen and Kuorikoski (op.cit; henceforth referred to as L&K), from an
epistemic, epistemological and methodological point of view as economists and
economics, is handsomely satis￿ed by a Phillips Machine simulation, if struc-
tured and implemented in any traditional experimental sense (whether in the
form suggested by L&K or even in more senses than that, as shown in the
famous Fermi-Pasta-Ulam exercise, to which we will turn now, brie￿ y).
In their fascinating recapitulation of the circumstances under which Enrico
Fermi, John Pasta and Stanislaw Ulam tried to resolve a theoretical conundrum
￿ and still completely unresolved ￿ with a discrete approximation of contin-
uum model implemented on one of the ￿rst available digital computers ￿the
MANIAC ￿Porter, et.al ([105]) point out the many ways in which the simu-
lations interacted with the analytical theory to enrich both in surprising ways.
The epistemic, epistemological and methodological implications of the series of
simulations that have been implemented, with increasing precision, detail and
mechanical and hydraulic components. The constraints of natural laws, in the processing of
data, for example, are common to any physical mechanism - whether analogue or digital.
6A truncated version of which appears in [72], chapter 13, pp. 118-9. Copies of the full
memoir and the covering letter to Nicholas Stern were sent by Goodwin to the ￿rst author,
who will be happy make them available to interested readers.
7In the unabridged memoir, this ￿ PS￿appears as (italics added):
"Furthermore, I was very excited to ￿nd Phillips had two of his magical ma-
chines in London, so I could reproduce what I had analyzed back in 1947 in my
dynamical coupling paper. If I remember correctly, Phillips did not believe we
could produce erratic behaviour by coupling his machines ￿but we did."
5generalizations in the ￿fty-￿ve years since the original ￿ experiment￿ ,are exhaus-
tively discussed and dissected in the admirable monograph by Thomas Weissert8
([165]). As they perceptively and clearly9 note (ibid, pp. 214-6; italics added):
"....Fermi had long been fascinated by a fundamental mystery
of statistical mechanics that physicists call the ￿ arrow of time￿[irre-
versibility]. .... Fermi believed that the key [to the unlocking of the
mystery of irreversibility] was nonlinearity .... He knew that it would
be far too complicated to ￿nd solution to nonlinear equations using
pencil and paper. Fortunately, because he was at Los Alamos in the
early 1950s, he had access to one of the earliest digital computers
[the MANIAC]. .... The FPU problem was one of the ￿rst open sci-
enti￿c investigations carried out with the MANIAC, and it ushered
in the age of what is sometimes called experimental mathematics.
.....[by] which we mean computer-based investigations designed to
give insight into complex mathematical and physical problems that
are inaccessible, at least initially, using more traditional forms of
analysis. .... With Pasta and Ulam, Fermi proposed to investigate
what he assumed would be a very simple nonlinear dynamical sys-
tem. .. The Key question FPU wanted to study was how long
it would take the oscillations of the masses and nonlinear springs
to come to equilibrium. ... They were absolutely astonished by the
results."
The FPU problem exempli￿es every aspect of epistemic, epistemological and
methodological issue that can be conceived ￿not all of which, though confronted,
have been adequately resolved even after ￿fty ￿ve years of deeply serious the-
oretical and empirical attempts. We mention again the FPU problem, brie￿ y,
below, from an epistemic and epistemological point of view, especially in con-
junction with a computational dynamic macroeconomic problem one of us (see
[173]) has attempted to resolve by structured simulation studies, in close com-
bination with established macrodynamic and interindustrial economics.
Petroski￿ s brief but illuminating description and general discussion of the
analogue ￿ ￿ the 40-meter long replica￿ ￿ model that was used in the ￿ wind-
tunnel tests￿emphasizes those elements that were neglected in the construction
of the Millennium Bridge. As emphasized by Dr Allan McRobie, during his
conversation with Velupillai (see ￿rst footnote in this section), the construction
8Although even this admirable monograph is now ￿ thirteen years after publication ￿
clearly out of date, given the massive research and results on variations of the Fermi-Pasta-
Ulam (henceforth referred to as FPU) problem that have been, and are being, conducted at
the frontiers of what has come to be called ￿ experimental nonlinear dynamics￿ .
9One of the authors of this crystal clear exposition of the FPU problem, Norman Zabusky,
was himself a pioneer in extracting new theoretical directions of research ￿and, indeed, to-
gether with his co-author, Martin Kruskal, to whose memory this particular article is dedicated
in (re-)discovering and giving a mathematical formalism to ￿ solitary waves￿ , now called soli-
tons. By retaining the original continuum domain of the FPU theoretical framework, and
eschewing the discretizations necessary for digital computer implementation, they were able
to predict the existence of solitons (see, in particular, [169]).
6of a bridge is less about physics and engineering than about people because
when a bridge is in use, especially a pedestrian dominated suspension bridge,
it becomes a ￿ nonlinear biological system￿ . This implies an analogue computa-
tion model for simulation that is a coupled system of the interaction between
engineering structures and human beings. Failing to take this into account in
the analogue computing simulation of the Millennium Bridge construction at its
design and testing stages led to the bridge having to be closed within 20 minutes
of the long-awaited opening, due to the fearful wobbling when pedestrians be-
gan their presence felt. In other words, the analogue simulation ￿buttressed,
of course, by various uses of the digital computer ￿failed to study the design
problem as one that should have been studies as a nonlinear, coupled, oscillator
- just as the FPU problem was, and just as it still remains a mystery, so will
bridge building be, in the sense that there is, at present, no complete charac-
terization of the dynamics of nonlinear, coupled, oscillators. Every epistemic,
epistemological and methodological conundrum faced, many solved, by the FPU
problem has to be faced in the construction of every bridge, especially if it is
a suspension bridge. Naturally, every model of an economy to be studied by
computer ￿whether digital or analogue ￿simulations, and underpinned by eco-
nomic theory is naturally and intrinsically coupled, but nonlinearly. It is this
latter fact that is often neglected in much of the recent simulation-dominated
literature, to which we will return in the sequel.
The fourth of the serendipitous articles is by Hall & Day ([55]), reviving
and reminding us, in this age of increasing environmental concerns, the simple,
but powerful, message of Malthus. The much maligned dichotomy between an
entity growing exponentially while relying for its growth on something else grow-
ing arithmetically was made (in)famous, particularly in economics and public
policy, by the well-meaning Malthus, to be revived, in one form or another, par-
ticularly in economics, whenever even a shadow of an exhaustible resource was
seen in the horizon. Perhaps the most spectacularly dramatic example of a neo-
Malthusian apocalyptic scenario for economic societies, smug in their reliance
on the manna of exogenous, technological, factors to propel them through the
golden era ￿and beyond ￿of Keynesian prosperity, was the ill-timed release of
the Club of Rome document on Limits to Growth ([83]). It was ill-timed in
both positive and negative senses: the ￿rst oil price hikes, the great stag￿ ation
of the 1970s, the collapse of the Bretton Woods compromises, the demise of
the Neoclassical Synthesis, the rise of varieties of Monetarism and, eventually,
the emergence of endogenous growth theory and the Miracle Economies of East
Asia, together with the all-embracing dominance attained by Newclassical eco-
nomics, discrediting any attempt at active policy in any domain, were all in
the horizon. With hindsight it may arguably be remarked that almost nothing
discredited ￿although Hall & Day (ibid) show, convincingly, that the reasoning
and analysis underpinning the original Limits to Growth manifesto have stood
the test of time most admirably ￿the intellectual credibility of simulation-based
analysis and projections than this one single work, directed by the founding Fa-
7ther of System Dynamics, Jay Forrester10. It is little remembered or recounted
that Forrester￿ s initial fame owed as much to his use of what has come to be
called ￿ hand-held simulations￿to resolve an internal conundrum of employment
stability, independent of the economy-wide business cycle, at General Electric,
as to his insight into the need for understanding corporate dynamism in terms of
the interaction between engineering and management synergies. In our opinion,
however, the main reason for the discrediting could be found in the philosophy
underpinning the Limits to Growth methodology, which was unanchored in the-
ory. It was, to the economist at least, a case of not even ￿ measurement without
theory￿ , for a generation of economists who were to extol the virtues of ￿ theory
ahead of measurement￿ . Moreover, the epistemological justi￿cation of the Lim-
its to Growth policy prescription would have to be made on inferring general
propositions from induction, forgetting Hume￿ s dictum and Popper￿ s strictures
against this noble practice by distinguished empiricists and scientists, all the
way from Newton to Darwin. In the spirit of the disciplining criterion for simu-
lation modelling of complex, intractable, dynamical systems mentioned above,
we ourselves locate the weakness of the case made in the Limits to Growth lit-
erature - then and now, thirty years later ([84] ￿in its eschewing a nonlinear,
coupled, dynamics framework in modelling the interaction between a natural
system and its dependent human, economic, ￿ sink￿ . The dynamics of such cou-
pled, nonlinear, dynamical systems cannot be breached ￿even provably so ￿by
known analytical approaches and require, as one learns from the ￿fty-￿ve year
unresolved saga of the FPU problem, the helping hand of computer simulations
to get a handle on plausible dynamical evolutions and possible policy responses,
even if only in limited senses. Of course, there was also the problem of the lack
of theoretical underpinnings, above all in economic theory.
If anything is to be learned from the four examples, serendipitously brought
together in just celebrations of their various anniversaries, it is that the syn-
ergies between intractable coupled nonlinear dynamics, underlying theoretical
conundrums and exploitation of the ubiquity of the emerging power of new
and innovative paradigms of computations, could ￿at best ￿be exploited for
advancing the respective disciplines only with an attitude of modesty in epis-
temological aims, humility in the face of methodological ￿in the limited sense
of methods of mathematics ￿limitations and a generosity of spirit in the light
of philosophical confusions. Ultra reliance and untrammeled con￿dence in the
10This is the general view, even of those who were ￿ and remain ￿ sympathetic to the
message, if not the full paraphernalia of methods, of The Club of Rome report ([43], p.6;
italics added):
"The Club of Rome simulations which predicted global environmental catastro-
phe made a major impact, but also gave simulation an undeservedly poor repu-
tation as it became clear that the results depended very heavily on the speci￿c
quantitative assumptions made about the model￿ s parameters. Many of these
assumptions were backed by rather little evidence."
With hindsight, too, it was regrettable that The Club of Rome team were not familiar with
the art, science, methodology and epistemology of simulation that was being learned as the
attempt to solve the FPU problem was being ￿ played out￿ .
8power of one kind of mathematical analysis, if coupled (sic!) to unre￿ ective
con￿dence in the power of the emerging paradigms of computation to solve the
unsolvable, has caused much mischief in the sciences ￿both natural and social.
Shunning simulation ￿an attitude not con￿ned to the economists ￿is akin to
the precept warned against by that old adage, not to throw away the baby with
the bathwater.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we outline,
as succinctly as possible, L&K￿ s claims about ￿ the economist￿ s perfect model￿ ..
The list of infelicities in their claims is embarrassingly and surprisingly long.
Some of the misrepresentations and infelicities are corrected as we go along,
in section 2 itself; others require detailed dissections and remedies, some of
which are attempted in section 3, which is devoted to their e⁄orts at ￿ reinvent-
ing the square wheel￿ , i.e., rede￿ning economics!. Section 4 is on Computation,
Discretization, Proof and Other Mathematical Infelicities. In section 5 we at-
tempt to summarize, as concisely as possible, the core areas of economics which
initiated and maintained what we call ￿ the noble tradition of simulation in eco-
nomics￿ .The ￿nal section tries to draw the threads together to outline a bright
vision for economics, yet remembering the melancholy failures of past claims.
2 The Economist￿ s Perfect Model
"Perfection, of a kind, was what he was after,
And the poetry he invented was easy to understand;
......
When he laughed, respectable senators burst with laughter,
And when he cried the little children died in the streets."
Epitaph On A Tyrant by W.H. Auden (italics added)
In their fundamental, pioneering, simulation-based, development of evolu-
tionary growth theory, Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter carefully ￿but un-
ambiguously ￿point out that:
"It is, in short, a very pernicious doctrine that portrays simulation
as a nontheoretical activity, in which the only guiding rule is to
￿ copy￿reality as closely as possible. If reality could be ￿ copied￿into
a computer program, that approach might be productive ￿but it
cannot, and it is not."11
[93], p.209; italics added
11L&K take on board the criticisms in [138] to ￿nesse their ￿ de￿nition￿of the perfect model
(see especially p. 314 in L&K). Teller￿ s possibly caricatured starting point of a de￿nition of a
mythical model of a perfect model is worth recalling:
"The photograph provides a good icon: The ambition has been to produce a
perfect likeness of nature, a perfect model. ...... Of course characterizing our
e⁄orts to describe nature as aimed at producing a perfect model is itself a model
of the human knowledge-gathering enterprise. Hence we may call it the Perfect
9It is regrettable that the L&K vision of simulation systematically ￿ portrays
[it] as a nontheoretical activity￿ . We think this vision is an inevitable result of
their faulty norm of The Economist￿ s Perfect Model, their less than desirable
mastery of economics ￿in its theoretical, empirical and methodological senses ￿
and, even more decisively, due to their highly slippery grounding in the theory of
computation, foundations of mathematics and the theory of numerical analysis.
Mercifully, however, L&K eschew any such exclusive ￿ guiding rule￿ . Instead
they opt, in their (admittedly loose) de￿nition of ￿ the economist￿ s perfect model￿ ,
to be guided by Hausman￿ s claim that ￿ economics is an inexact science￿ , by which
￿at least according to L&K ￿he is supposed to have ￿ meant that, unlike the
natural sciences12, it has the capacity to characterize economic relationships
only inexactly because the idealization13and abstractions necessary to produce
generalizations are not fully eliminable￿ (p.314; italics added). Against this
particular backdrop to a meaning for ￿ inexactness￿ , L&K go on to outline ￿we
are reluctant to use the words ￿ characterize￿or ￿ de￿ne￿- what they intend to
mean by ￿ the economist￿ s perfect model￿ , which has to be ￿ analytically tractable￿
￿even at the cost of ￿ sacri￿cing numerical accuracy￿￿and contains ￿ idealizations
and abstractions￿ , and they go on (p.314; italics added):
"[B]ut [the economist￿ s perfect model] is exact in the sense that
it is formulated in terms of an exact formal language. The perfect
model should capture the important relationships as logical connec-
tions between a few privileged economic concepts14. Thus the Haus-
Model Model."
[138], p. 393; italics & emphasis added
12Are ￿ point masses￿ , frictionless pendula and the like not ￿ idealizations￿? What are the
underpinnings of the laws that characterise ￿ all of classical physics￿(cf. [34], §18.3 and Table
18-1)? Gravitation, the four Maxwell equations, and the three laws of motion (￿ Newton￿ s law,
with Einstein￿ s modi￿cation￿ ), force and conservation of charge, characterize ￿ all of classical
physics￿(ibid). Which of these laws, if any, are derived without ￿ idealizations and abstrac-
tions￿ . Having reached ￿ the top of K-2 ￿ we are nearly ready for Mount Everest, which is
quantum mechanics￿(ibid, p. 18-5). Do the ￿ idealizations and abstractions￿diminish as we
grope our way forward to an understanding, say, of Schr￿dinger￿ s equations ￿or even to be able
to manipulate the hitherto non-axiomatizable ￿ Feynman diagrams￿? In fairness to L&K these
objections should be directed at Hausman, but not quite; it is L&K who choose, explicitly, to
be guided by their own interpretations of Hausman in the senses noted above.
13David Ruelle, who has imaginatively combined deep mathematical theory, computer-
aided proof methods and numerical simulations in his pioneering work on nonlinear dynamics
observed, with characteristic directness ([112], 121; italics in the original):
"[M]athematical physics deals with idealized systems. We know that a water
molecule is composed of oxygen and hydrogen nuclei surrounded by electrons and
that the nuclei also have a composite structure. There is good reason to believe
that these complications are not essential to understanding [phase transitions].
A reasonable approach (in fact, the only feasible approach) is to study a variety
of idealized systems."
14By this we presume L&K ￿correctly, in our opinion ￿mean concepts like rationality and
equilibrium. But there are, of course, many di⁄erent ways to de￿ne these concepts, even in
an ￿ exact formal language￿ , especially because there are many such ￿ exact formal languages￿ .
10manian inexactness of economics leads to a requirement for formal
exactness in the models."
However, then they go on to ￿ spoil￿this by claiming15 that (ibid; second set
of italics added):
"Simulation models are, at best, merely approximations of such
models. It is also instructive to realize that, even though simulation
results are expressed in an exact numerical form, in economics they
cannot be perfected. This is .... because, unlike some natural sci-
ences, economics does not have any natural constants to discover in
the ￿rst place. "
We can list several objections to this claim. First of all, as pointed out in
the previous footnote, there are perfectly valid and accepted simulation-theoretic
economic models ￿the example we have given so far is the Nelson-Winter evolu-
tionary growth model, but more will be ￿ o⁄ered￿in the next section ￿that are not
approximations to any ￿ such model￿ , allegedly formulated in terms of ￿ an exact
formal language￿ . Secondly, it is entirely feasible ￿and achieved with increasing
frequency, even in the form of publications in the ￿ve journals commonly con-
sidered the most prestigious￿(L&K, p. 305)16 ￿to formulate economic theory
in the exact formal language underpinning recursion theory or any form of con-
structive mathematics such that the ￿ simulation model￿is naturally exact and
not an approximation to anything ￿perfect or not. Thirdly, even in those nat-
ural sciences that are allegedly in possession of ￿ natural constants to discover￿ ,
it is not clear how ￿ naturally constant￿they are, when even the constancy of the
gravitational constant is subject to some quali￿cations17. Fourthly, nowhere in
The formal language corresponding to, say, set theory, is quite di⁄erent from that which
encapsulates proof theory or model theory.
15Contrary to the spirit, letter and practice of the noble work that went into the founding and
￿ourishing practice of a rigorous, simulation-theoretic, Schumpeterian Evolutionary Theory of
Growth, pioneered by Nelson and Winter ([93]). Incidentally, one of the ￿ 47 hits in JSTOR with
￿simulation￿ in the title￿(L&K, p. 305) would have been (cf. [92]) Richard Nelson￿ s classic
piece on Simulation of Schumpeterian Competition. The Nelson-Winter simulation-theoretic
evolutionary growth models are no ￿ approximations￿to any such ￿ economist￿ s perfect formal
model￿ ; they are exact in their own right, in the formalism of the programming language with
which they simulate. Surely, L&K must know that every programming language, if correct,
must be exact and correspond to the mathematics of either recursion theory or one or another
variety of constructivism. That they are not quite in command of this will become clear in
the sequel.
16See, for example, [164], for a fairly complete list of such works.
17Dirac, in the George Gamov Memorial Volume ([29]), discussed ￿ The Variability of the
Gravitational Constant￿ , especially now that the ￿ steady state model of the universe has fallen
into disfavour￿ . In a cosmological world underpinned by the steady state theory (of Hoyle,
Gold and others), ￿ all variations of natural constant are ruled out.￿ In a telling caveat to his
precise discussion, Dirac notes (ibid, p. 58):
"When one is making such a drastic change in Newton￿ s laws as allowing the
constant of gravity to vary, special consequences of Newton￿ s laws like the con-
servation of angular momentum require reconsideration. One need some general
principle as a guide to how Newton￿ s laws are a⁄ected."
11L&K can one ￿nd a de￿nition ￿or meaning for ￿￿ analytically tractable￿ . It
is possible they mean ￿ analytically solvable￿in the sense that in the particular
economic theory under discussion, or for the particular di⁄erential equation or,
more generally, dynamical system, in consideration, it can be proved there exists
an equilibrium or a solution (or a multiplicity of solutions). But this kind of
solvability is quite independent of tractability in any sense in which that word is
used in formal mathematics. We will have more on this aspect in the sequel. Fi-
nally, what can they mean by ￿ approximation of such models￿ , if the models are
formulated in an ￿ exact formal language￿that is devoid of any computable ￿i.e.,
recursion theoretic ￿or constructive underpinning? For example, it is clear that
formal general equilibrium theory of the Arrow-Debreu genre, or orthodox game
theory in its Nash incarnations, are undoubtedly ￿ formulated in terms of exact
formal language￿￿at least in the eyes of the economic theorist who adheres
to one kind of mathematics (real analysis underpinned by Zermelo-Fraenkel set
theory + the axiom of choice). However, the equilibria and rationality associated
with, and underpinning them, are provably uncomputable and non-constructive.
How, then, can one devise a simulation model as approximations to them? The
exact formal language in which these theories and their models are framed are
provably impossible to approximate in any meaningful sense.
Our conclusion at this stage is, therefore, that the L&K starting point, to
make a reasonable case for their main aim, i.e., that economists shun simulation,
is untenable. They are, obviously, not economists18, for if they were, they would
not have tried to embark on this futile attempt to de￿ne ￿ the economist￿ s perfect
model￿ . Economists, in particular the practising ones, are better informed than
try to appeal to a ￿ perfect model￿which they have to ￿ approximate￿in their
empirical work. On the other hand, if L&K were to base their case with the
starting point in two perceptive re￿ ections on what, in another sense, can be
interpreted as the futility of norming economic practice on the altar of the
￿ perfect model￿ , they may have done their case ￿even if untenable on other
grounds ￿more service. Clower, in his Presidential Address to the Southern
Economic Society ([16], pp. 805-6) noted with characteristically acerbic wit:
"Before I proceed, let me emphasize that by ￿ pure theory￿I do
not mean what most working economists ... mean when they use
the word ￿ theory￿without further quali￿cation. Generally speaking,
we mean by ￿ theory￿the fact-oriented creative mixture of intuition,
casual empirical knowledge, and seat-of-the pants logic that is found
in virtually all ￿ applied economic analysis￿and, indeed, in virtually
everything called ￿ economics￿before 1950. ... By pure theory I mean
the axiomatically-based neowalrasian analysis of Arrow-Debreu .. .
and closely related o⁄shoots that serve as a standard of ￿ economic
correctness￿in all modern teaching not only in microeconomics but
18Their credentials in mathematics, mathematical physics and even the foundations of math-
ematics is equally questionable, if one is to infer anything from the many incorrect and in-
felicitous remarks they make, at various points, in the paper. Examples of these infelicities,
regrettably, will have to be presented in the ensuing discussions.
12in macroeconomics, money and banking, ￿nance, and econometrics."
By ￿ economic correctness￿Clower means what Howitt referred to as ￿ the
neowalrasian code￿(and what we think L&K should have meant when they
tried to de￿ne ￿ the economist￿ s perfect model￿ ) :
"[A]dherence to an increasingly complex code of formal ideas has
become the overriding criterion of success, rather than the fruitful
modelling of observed phenomena. The code of modern economics
has become for the most part that of neowalrasian analysis, with its
rules for modelling all behaviour as the outcome of rational choice.
.... But accounting for some phenomenon in a discipline dominated
by an elaborate code consists not of telling stories designed to con-
vince others that this is why the phenomenon exists, or why it ap-
pears the way it does, but of telling stories, no matter how ad hoc,
that incorporate some aspect of the phenomenon, no matter how
trivial, without violating the code. ....
In many ways, modern economic theory has ....become a purely
logical discipline in which the objective is to follow a set of a pri-
ori rules with no connection to the external world. ..... Economists
building ￿ rational models￿to account for things not found in con-
ventional theory think of themselves as seeking explanation in the
usual sense, whereas in fact they are just addressing purely semantic
questions that do not even arise once one ventures out of the ne-
owalrasian cloister. Only by the rarest ￿ uke could someone working
under such delusions come up with a convincing scienti￿c explana-
tion of anything."
[63], pp. 75-6; italics added.
If we are to take seriously the L&K ￿ de￿nition￿of a ￿ simulation model￿￿given
above ￿then they are, at best, purely semantic entities! None of the natural
sciencs, certainly not physics or biology, even in their various modern incarna-
tions, ￿whether applied or pure ￿have succeeded in de￿ning its subject matter
in terms of an exact formal language. Why should economists have tried to do
it? In fact nothing or no one can be accused of this particular vice. That they
are wedded to the neowalrasian code is what L&K should have meant and, then,
they could make a case for the impossibility of its computability and, therefore,
by direct implication the impossibility of any meaningful approximation. The
result will, of course, have to be the logical non sequitur that those wedded to
the neowalrasian code will have to shun simulation. For, what else can they do
￿especially since a strong factual case can be made, as we will show in the next
section, that those who abandoned the neowalrasian code have been wedded,
instead, to simulation, theoretically, methodologically and epistemologically.
133 Reinventing the Square Wheel - Yet Another
￿ De￿nition￿of Economics
" ....




The eye of the needle, the loss of the thread..."
Words by Keith Reid (italics added)
Ricardo, with the characteristic integrity one has come to associate with
him, in his now famous October 9, 1820 letter to Malthus ([107], pp. 278-9),
delineated the scope of classical economics, in its ￿ magni￿cent dynamics￿mode
(pace Baumol19), in terms of the search for an understanding of the laws of
(functional) income distribution:
"Political Economy, you think, is an enquiry into the nature and
causes of wealth ￿ I think it should rather be called an enquiry
into the laws which determine the division of produce of industry
amongst the classes that concur in its formation. No law can be laid
down respecting quantity, but a tolerably correct one can be laid
down respecting proportions. Every day I am more satis￿ed that
the former enquiry is vain and delusive, and the latter the only true
object of the science."
Lionel Robbins e⁄ectively encapsulated the neoclassical dethroning of ￿ mag-
ni￿cent dynamics￿and its preoccupation with e¢ cient allocation of scarce re-
sources with his famous de￿nition of economics as ([108]; p. 24; italics added):
"Economics, we have seen, is concerned with that aspect of behaviour
which arises from the scarcity of means to achieve given ends."
Ricardo￿ s de￿nition is purely ￿ macroeconomic￿ 20, devoid of any reference to
individual behaviour; Robbins, in true neoclassical spirit, enthrones the sanctity
19
"We consider these older dynamic systems [of the classical economists] simply
because, although imperfect, they represent an approach of which there are
few recent examples ... for the approach is of a magni￿cent cast, ambitiously
attempting to analyze the growth and development of entire economies over
relatively long periods of time ￿decades or even centuries."
[5], pp. 13-14; italics added.
20Of course, the word ￿ macroeconomics￿had not, then, been coined; it emerged in its modern
senses, but within a context that would have been completely consistent with the classical
usage of the phrase ￿ political economy￿ , in the mid to late 1930s. A fairly complete note on
the origins of the term ￿ macroeconomics￿is given in [158].
14of individual behaviour ￿and thereby, eventually, the fulcrum of rationality on
which behaviour would be swivelled ￿in the search for e¢ ciency with which
ends can be met, given the scarcity of means.
Between them, outside the Marxian tradition, was that Ricardian Method-
ological Individualist (if this is not an oxymoron) par excellence: John Stuart
Mill. ￿ Political economy￿￿the Ricardian Mill says ￿is concerned with man
￿ solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging
of the comparative e¢ ciency of means for obtaining that end￿([87], p. 137)￿
the Mill who Robbins would have approved21.
Now we have two philosophers reinventing the square wheel, by trying to
rede￿ne economics, wearing blinkers provided by their dependence on agent-
based economics. ￿ Economics￿ , these two philosophers state (ibid, p. 304),
￿ is concerned with aggregate outcomes of interdependent individual decision-
making in some institutional context.￿ Indeed, among the many ￿ concerns￿of
economists, whether of micro or macro persuasions, whether game theorists or
IO theorists and practitioners, whether those concentrating on law & economics
or Institutional economics, whether the many interested in varieties of public
choice and social choice theories, whether of behavioural or experimental eco-
nomic concerns, and many other permutations and combinations of mentioned
and unmentioned ￿elds, this one, narrow, aspect is also of relevance ￿particu-
larly to the practitioners of varieties of agent-based modelling in economics and
￿nance. In passing, it may be useful to point out to them ￿and to the many
agent-based modellers to whom they refer ￿ that the origins of what these
authors call ￿ generative science￿(p. 310)22 lies in the noble work of the ￿ last￿
of the Classical Economists, John Stuart Mill ([86], and, then, codi￿ed by his
friend George Henry Lewes, [75]).
With this dubious reinvention of the square wheel, the authors then go on to
state, use and invoke incorrectly, a series of economic concepts, to make sense of
their claims and aims (of which there are many, not all of them consistent with
each other, or the several references they invoke). It will be both tedious and
somewhat embarrassing to list, discuss and dissect all of their infelicities. We
shall only point out some of the more glaring ones, partly to put in perspective
the discussion in the next main section, on the noble tradition of simulation in
economics.
L&K, immediately after their codi￿cation of what they assert to be the
￿ concerns of economics￿ , follow with two highly dubious claims (pp. 304-5): one,
that ￿ microeconomic theory ascribes only relatively simple rules to individuals￿
21A nuanced, almost, exhaustive discussion of these issues can be found in the excellent book
by Wade Hands ([57]) - which should appeal to two philosophers who seem to have opinions
- but very little knowledge - of methodological and epistemological problems in economics.
22It is possible that L&K bent over backwards to avoid using the current hypeword and
phrase, emergence and emergent science, which are, however, freely and free-swingingly used
by agent-based modellers, particularly those with macroeconomic persuasions and pretensions.
The concept of emergents was introduced by Lewes (op.cit), on the basis of Mill￿ s ideas (op.cit)
on heteropathic laws. We have, in other writings, emphasized that a close and careful reading
of these two classics leave us no alternative but to interpret their thoughts on these issues
algorithmically.
15choice behaviour￿and, secondly, that ￿ market forms can usually be given an
exact description￿ . The former claim, in a kind of variation on a theme, is later
mangled into a patently false assertion on revealed preference, which simply
strengthens our conviction that the authors have no grounding whatsoever in
any kind of serious economics (p. 321; italics added):
"[E]conomists consider revealed preference theory as .. a successful
black-boxing [sic!] theory because it is taken to allow for studying
aggregate-level relationships while making the internal workings of
individual minds irrelevant."
Paul Samuelson must not only be turning, but positively writhing in pain,
in his grave. Nothing in revealed preference theory, choice theory in general, or
even in modern behavioural and neuroeconomics has anything to do with the
￿ internal working of the mind￿of an agent23, whether rational or not; at best,
in modern economic analysis, there are references to the ￿ internal workings of
the brain￿ . That two philosophers can be so sloppy on this distinction borders
on the absurd. And, then, had the authors done what is expected in a scholarly
article, with wide-ranging claims, of checking with the fountainhead of revealed
preference theory, they would have read, in [116], p. 243 (italics added: where,
by the way, Samuelson, with characteristic perspicacity, allows for what modern
behavioural economists try to highlight):
"[T]he individual guinea-pig, by his market behaviour, reveals his
preference pattern ￿if there is such a consistent pattern."
Nothing in revealed preference theory, moreover, has anything to do with
aggregate-level behaviour, unless, of course, L&K adhere to the neowalrasian
code of the newclassical economists and work with the representative agent
paradigm of macroeconomics, which they avowedly disown24.
As for the possibility of giving ￿ an exact description of market forms￿a wholly
di⁄erent set of economic theorists ￿living and dead ￿would be ￿ abbergasted
with the assertion, to put it mildly, especially if L&K mean by ￿ exact description￿
they mean in terms of an ￿ exact formal language￿ . We need only refer to
the Tirole￿ s encyclopedic text on The Theory of Industrial Organization, [144],
for L&K to refresh their knowledge and understanding of the indeterminacies
inherent in the interaction between market forms and individual behaviour. The
relatively weak assumptions on individual behaviour ￿if we are charitable to
grant this as the meaning of ￿ relatively simple behaviour￿referred to by L&K
￿is bought at the price of a special class of competitive equilibrium market
23In fact, Samuelson does refer to the ￿ mind￿ s eye￿ , but not in the context of the agent￿ s
mind as the repository of individual preferences. The reference was, as a matter of fact,
in the context of something that is highly relevant to the issues raised in L&K: numerical
computations, approximations, algorithmic procedures and the like!
24What L&K need to refer to, at this point, is what we have come to call the Sonnenschein-
Mantel-Debreu theorem (see, for example, [129] or [80]). It is this theorem, in the framework
of the neowalrasian code, that makes it possible to be precisely ￿ loose￿about individual pref-
erences when using, say, an aggregate demand function.
16behaviour (cf., just for starters, p. 7, [144]). However, as we go from this kind
of market form to increasingly non-competitive market forms, the speci￿cation
of individual behaviour becomes less determinate, superimposed upon the many
indeterminacies in de￿ning market forms. It may be apposite to recall Tirole￿ s
cryptic, but telling, point (ibid, p. 12):
"The notion of a market is by no means simple. ... There is no simple
recipe for de￿ning a market, as is demonstrated by the many debates
among economists and antitrust practitioners about the degree of
monopoly power in speci￿c industries."
If there is ￿ no simple recipe for de￿ning a market￿ , wherein is the origin for
the claim that ￿ market forms can be given an exact description￿? The rest of
the ￿rst paragraph of L&K is replete with incoherent claims due to a lack of
understanding that individual behaviour, in interacting economies, cannot be
de￿ned independently of the particular market form under which they interact ￿
and even then there is no hope of either ￿ exact description￿ , especially if ￿ exact￿
is to be ￿ in the sense of an exact formal language￿ 25, or de￿ning ￿ simple rules to
individuals￿choice behaviour￿ . Indeed, it is easy to show, formally, that even the
formalization of rational behaviour in its simplest26 version requires the agent
to be able to be more powerful than the most powerful, ideal, Turing Machine
(cf. [152], chapter 3).
L&K claim ￿ that economists shun simulation for epistemic and understanding-
related reasons is a factual one￿ . This claim is coupled to two of their explicitly
stated aims (p. 306): ￿rstly, in aiming ￿ to contribute to the recent philosophical
discussion on scienti￿c understanding￿and that the ￿ economists￿image of under-
standing emphasizes analytical rather than numerical exactness, and adeptness
in logical argumentation rather than empirical knowledge of causal mechanisms￿ .
Secondly, ￿ to explain and evaluate these reasons ￿for ￿ shunning simulations￿￿
by considering the philosophical presuppositions of economists￿ . Now, these
aims are interesting, even laudable; but ￿ the factual claim￿on which their aims
are explained and evaluated are, at best, ￿ imsy and more generally simply un-
true (as we will show in our discussions of the noble tradition of simulation in
25In particular, this is also a frequent mistake made by thoughtless computer simulations by
agent-based modellers, especially in their so-called macroeconomics, seeking to mimic aggrega-
tive patterns, seemingly observable in actual economic data. In this endeavour ￿of seeking to
mimic so-called patterns in aggregative data ￿they are not alone: the formidable orthodoxy
of the newclassical economist￿ s ubiquitous DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium)
methodology seeks the same goal. In this simplistic inductive methodology ￿partly the rea-
son for the scepticism many theorists, even orthodox and eminent ones, express ￿they show
very little respect for Trygve Haavelmo￿ s early warning against such practice (even before his
fundamental work which codi￿ed the Cowles Foundation methodology of Econometrics), in
[52]). The only possibility in defense against Haavelmo￿ s perceptive and serious criticisms of
the kind of economics endorsed by L&K, untrammeled agent-based modelling, is to respond
by claiming, correctly, that in this kind of work there is no a priori serious theory to begin
with!
26There is, then, the question of what one should mean by ￿ simple￿and ￿ simplest￿ , which
we have tackled in our work on algorithmic complexity theory, but that is quite another story
(see [152], chapter 5).
17economics). Even apart from this, if we grant them their ￿ de￿nition￿of simu-
lation, then it is clear that anyone who does not subscribe to the neowalrasian
code ￿pro tempore, to be identi￿ed with L&K￿ s ￿ economist￿ s perfect model￿￿
will not endorse this kind of simulation. If, therefore, they are serious about
their de￿nition of simulation, then apart from the tiny orthodox group, en-
sconced in the neowalrasian cloister, all other economists and economics will,
naturally and de￿nitionally, shun simulation. This will, then, include past and
present giants who have made simulation in economics are noble art, as well as
a science: Ragnar Frisch, Erik Lundberg, Richard Goodwin, Edward Chamber-
lin, Bill Phillips, Robert Strotz, Wassily Leontief, Tjalling Koopmans, Herbert
Simon, James Meade, Richard Nelson, Sidney Winter, Richard Day, Richard
Stone, Vernon Smith and scores of other only slightly lesser mortals. It is in-
teresting to recall that even in this partial list there are seven Nobel Laureates
￿some of whom were bastions of the neowalrasian code, indeed even helped in
devising the code, in the ￿rst place.
Just for elementary starters, Herbert Simon devoted a great part of his fer-
tile professional life towards investigating and elucidating ￿ empirical knowledge
of causal mechanisms￿ , by means of structured, theoretically underpinned, sim-
ulations. This particular aspect of Simon￿ s monumental contributions to the
interplay between economics, psychology, computer & administrative sciences
and evolutionary theory, was based on the notion of causality de￿ned, analyt-
ically, by Goodwin ([45]) to study, numerically and by structured simulations,
the dynamics of coupled markets. But this is a topic for detailed consideration
in the next section. We mention this here simply to emphasize the point that
L&K stand and stamp on quicksand, with their ￿ factual claim￿ , aims and def-
initions, and will get nowhere with them, except deeper down into a hole that
will naturally be formed by the soil in which they stand.
L&K attribute to ￿ analytical economists￿￿by now one supposes that this
class refers to those who are adherents of the neowalrasian code, which is itself
an alias for the ￿ perfect model￿￿the preference to be ￿ exactly wrong rather
than vaguely right￿(p. 315). Neither of us are adherents of the neowalrasian
code; however, we are serious students of the neowalrasian code, for, if not, how
can one criticize them? Neither of us are aware of any serious adherent of the
neowalrasian code of ever subscribing, explicitly, to this kind of sophistry. Once
again, we believe this to be a gratuitous, unscholarly, throwaway remark, with-
out substance or the possibility of substantiation. Indeed, it is also, once again,
due to deplorable ignorance of the history of economic thought, in addition to
less than sure grounding in economic theory ￿of any sort. The original version
of this misquoted and unattributed ￿ aphorism￿was an allusion to Marshall￿ s
method and attitude towards the construction of economic theory by Gerald
Shove in his masterly essay on the role of Marshall￿ s ￿ Principles￿in the devel-
opment of economic theory, during the ￿rst few decades of the last century,
particularly in Anglo-Saxon academic circles. Shove￿ s exact (sic!) allusion was
as follows ([120], p.323; ￿rst set of italics added):
"Partly no doubt this [i.e., the tendency within the theoretical com-
18partment (of economics) for mechanical concepts and analogies to
regain their primacy] has been due to the itch for precise results:
not all of us are content to act on the late Prof. Wilden Carr￿ s ad-
mirable motto (which might well have been Marshall￿ s), ￿ It is better
to be vaguely right than precisely wrong.￿ ... In those parts of eco-
nomics with which the Principles was concerned, there has been a
distinct reversion to Ricardo￿ s method and away from the Marshal-
lian blend of realism and abstraction: a return to the mechanical as
against the biological approach."
Where simulation interacts fruitfully with theory, as in the works of the many
economists we have listed above, the preference if clearly for being ￿ vaguely
right than precisely wrong￿ , simply because it would be the ￿rst step in an
iterative process that leads to a re￿nement of theory, feeding back next to a more
re￿ned simulation model, and so on. This was the way the FPU problem and
its paradoxes have been tackled ￿although still without a complete resolution
￿ and this was also the way Simon, Stone, Goodwin and Nelson-Winter, in
particular, proceeded in their imaginative and outstanding theory construction.
Of course, being ￿ exactly wrong￿has its place in scienti￿c practice within a
Popperian scheme of things, if there is no other alternative. But the Popperian
scheme of things is, in our opinion, less preferable to the Duhem-Quine world27
in economics ([22]), outside the neowalrasian cloisters.
Finally, L&K display utter confusion, if not total lack of familiarity, with the
meaning and scope of CGE28 modelling, not to mention the theoretical bases
that underpin varieties of Computable General Equilibrium modelling traditions,
the kinds of ￿elds designated Computational Economics and, therefore, end
up by equating this area of many successes ￿ and some failures ￿ with the
trivial work done by the adherents of the neowalrasian code, i.e., theorists and
practitioners of the DSGE29 approach. Computable General Equilibrium, in its
deep mathematical and algorithmic origins, was the research program initiated
by Herbert Scarf ([118]) to devise procedures to compute the Arrow-Debreu (and
Nash) equilibria. This became a feasible research program30 only after Uzawa
proved ([150]an equivalence result between Brouwer￿ s ￿xed point theorem and
27Which should be coupled to Interval Analysis ([88]) in the speci￿cation of computer codes
to minimize the side-e⁄ects ￿sometimes catastrophic even in terms of, costing directly, human
lives ￿due to the rounding errors of the digital computer￿ s internal mechanism of ￿oating point
representation of reals ([59]). The signi￿cance of interval arithmetic in computer-aided proof
will be mentioned later.
28L&K refer to CGE as Computational General Equilibrium, which is an elementary and
trivial indication of their lack of familiarity of the rich and deep work initiated by Scarf
to devise algorithms to compute the Arrow-Debreu General Equilibrium (GE). The path to
DSGE was that from GE to AGE (Applied General Equilibrium) to RCE (recursive Com-
petitive Equilibrium) and,then, to its current dominant position in macroeconomics as DSGE
(Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium). We will have more to discuss on these topics in
section 4, below.
29Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium ￿DSGE ￿but also referred to, sometimes, by
transposing the ￿rst two words and using SDGE as the acronym.
30At least in the opinion of the practitioners of AGE (cf. [121], [119] [85] and [68]).
19the Walrasian equilibrium existence theorem (cf. [154] and [157] for full details of
these issues). These were not ￿ models to conduct computerized macroeconomic
thought experiments￿(L&K, p. 309; italics added). They were, if anything, the
original and theoretically absolutely solid ￿though computably dubious ￿agent-
based models (not just thought experiments) which were set in their empirical
paces in computerized simulation policy experiments.
As for computational general equilibrium models, this, too, in one noble
tradition, was ￿and remains ￿a well-de￿ned ￿eld of research with a clearly
attributable origin: in the remarkable work by the Norwegian economist, Leif
Johansen ([67]). Had L&K done their homework and read also the ￿rst volume
of the two volume series, the second of which contains the article by Leigh
Tesfatsion ([140]) to which they refer31, they would have read the lead article
by Dixon & Parmenter ([30]) and could have avoided the non sequiturs on
CGE. In fact it is the ￿ other￿tradition of computational economics, that of
which the agent-based modelling approaches are a leading genre to which the
L&K comment that the ￿eld is ￿ not a very clearly de￿ned umbrella term for
the various computational approaches￿can be applied (although not even L&K
would be foolish enough to claim that agent-based modelling arose ￿ from certain
branches of the theories of general equilibrium and real business cycles￿ )32.
A result of this lack of familiarity with the serious ￿elds of CGE, AGE,
RCE, DSGE and the Leif Johansen tradition of computational economics, and
the peculiar de￿nition of simulations as approximations to a perfect model, L&K
are forced to make the untenable assertions on ￿ simulations￿and its role being
con￿ned to ￿ computing the equilibrium paths of macro-variables￿ , in the formal
game played by the inhabitants of the neowalrasian cloisters (p. 309).
4 Computation, Discretization, Proof and Other
Mathematical Infelicities
"[T]here is, strictly, no such thing as mathematical proof; that we
can, in the last analysis, do nothing but point33; that proofs are
what Littlewood and I call gas, rhetorical ￿ ourishes designed to a⁄ect
psychology, pictures on the board in the lecture, devices to stimulate
31Incidentally, the word ￿ constructive￿in this article by Tesfatsion has nothing to do with
constructive mathematics.
32There is a quite di⁄erent tradition of Computable General Equilibrium, pioneered by
Lance Taylor ([136]), where the foundation is not the neowalrasion code, but Stock-Flow
Consistent Social Accounting Matrices, a tradition to which also the distinguished macroeco-
nomic equilibrium growth theoretic work of the Nobel Laureate Richard Stone belongs ([130]).
But this is a topic for the next section.
33But ￿ point￿at what? At selecting, in the face of an undecidable disjunction, a particular
subsequence from a closed and bounded sequence of which it is a member? Or does one
point at the choice ￿i.e., a ￿ selection￿￿of an element from an uncountable in￿nity of sets,
appealing to the axiom of choice? These are the kinds of selections and choices that are
routinely appealed to, and claimed as feasible, in the proofs of theorems by the members of
the neowalrasian cloisters.
20the imagination of pupils. This is plainly not the whole truth, but
there is a good deal in it."
[58], p. 18; italics in the original
It may not be a particularly generous or enlightening strategy of exposition
to begin a section with what we think is an egregious error, from economic,
mathematical and computational points of view. But the example with which
we begin is, in a sense, paradigmatic of the confusion in L&K￿ s own exposition
and sorting it out may help the unsuspecting reader from propagating these
errors into posterity.
In their highly slippery discussion of the interaction between individual ra-
tional behaviour and equilibrium, they point out that ￿ the equilibrium that is
used to solve an analytical problem is based on mutual expectations￿which,
in turn, requires a resolution of an in￿nite regress in mutual expectations (pp.
310-1). They go on (p. 311):
"The role of equilibrium is that of breaking this and thus enabling
the derivation of a de￿nite solution. In equilibrium, none of the
agents has a unilateral incentive to change behaviour, and hence the
equilibrium ￿ determines￿how the agents will act. Computers cannot
model such an in￿nite regress of expectations because, being based
on constructive mathematics, they cannot handle it."
The non sequiturs in this paragraph are embarrassingly many, and covering
one of these by enclosing ￿ determines￿within quotation marks does not hide
the obfuscation. Essentially, L&K are groping towards a de￿nition of a Nash
equilibrium, but the economic environment and basis of agents￿behaviour is not
fully and well speci￿ed for one to be very certain of this; the whole set up could
easily be for some kind of more dynamic game theoretic set up, but let that
pass. The key objection we have to the claim in this statement can be divided
into three sub-objections:
￿ Computers cannot model such an in￿nite regress￿ ;
Computers, are ￿ based on34 constructive mathematics￿ ;
Constructive mathematics ￿ cannot handle￿in￿nite regress;
We will take these claims in the above order. First of all, it is plainly in-
correct that ￿ computers cannot handle an in￿nite regress￿ , particularly the kind
of in￿nite regress they de￿ne (admittedly in a very loose way). They fail to
point out that the in￿nite regress in expectation they refer to, in economics and
game theory, are ￿ broken￿by the utilization of one or another ￿x point theo-
rem, usually non-constructive and uncomputable35 ones. There are eminently
34Presumably, they mean ￿ computer behaviour￿ , i.e., the underlying program on the basis
of which the computer processes data, whether numerical or not.
35It is not clear that L&K understand the di⁄erence between recursion theory ￿i.e., com-
putability theory ￿and constructive mathematics.
21respectable constructive and computable ￿xed points that can be utilized to
￿ break￿the in￿nite regress emerging from the potential indeterminacies of mu-
tual expectations. One of us (see [155], §4) has, in fact, devised and derived
a perfectly well-de￿ned rational expectations equilibrium using the standard
mathematics of the computer ￿i.e., ￿ recursion theory￿ . Moreover, there is an
eminently rigorous ￿xed point theorem in constructive mathematics, derived
and proved constructively, on the basis of intuitionistc logic, by no less an au-
thority than Brouwer ([14]), which can be used to de￿ne the kind of equilibrium
with the in￿nite regress of mutual expectations L&K seem to want to de￿ne.
The caveat to these objections and our counter-claims are, of course, the im-
plication that one must go back to the proverbial ￿ drawing board￿and formalize
the basic closures of economic theory ￿especially preferences and endowments,
but technology, too, eventually ￿either in recursion theoretic terms of construc-
tively. Both of these enterprises are feasible, have been achieved successfully and
are, then, entirely consistent with using either a computer running on recursion
theoretic principles or on constructive mathematics foundations36.
Secondly, it is simply not true that computers ￿i.e., any standard, working,
computer, particularly those that are accessed by any and every economist ￿
and their associated workings are ￿ based on constructive mathematics￿ . In every
standard, working, computer, the mathematical basis is recursion theory (com-
putability theory), if anyone cares to think deep enough about it. It is not as
if one cannot make a working computer on the basis of constructive mathemat-
ics, or even make the standard Turing Machine realization implement programs
written in a language adapting some version of constructive mathematics37.
Thirdly, it is absolutely false that constructive mathematics ￿ cannot handle
in￿nite regress especially the kind needed in the L&K framework of individual
behaviour. Even apart from this, it is entirely feasible to handle varieties of
￿ in￿nite regress￿within constructive mathematics, except that the kind of ￿ in-
￿nities￿are more carefully de￿ned and invoked and, therefore, the nature of
economics in a constructive mode would be very di⁄erent from the orthodox
theory of individual rational behaviour, equilibria ￿whether game theoretic or
not ￿and, above all, the associated solutions (particularly via existence proofs,
typically of equilibria)38.
Obviously, the authors are blissfully innocent of any knowledge of the vast
36For a representative, but not exhaustive, sample of such work, see [164].
37See the eminently readable text by Nordstr￿m, Petersson & Smith ([96]) for an elegant
and accessible introduction to Martin-L￿f￿ s type theory, developed ￿ with the aim of being a
clari￿cation of constructive mathematics￿(ibid, p. 1). several of the essays in [21], particularly
chapters 1 & 6, are equally illuminative on the kind of approach to programming practica-
ble computers with program languages developed for the speci￿c purposes of encapsulating
constructive mathematics.
38Unfortunately, L&K go on to compound the above infelicities with a further absurdity
when they continue (ibid, p. 311):
"However, they [i.e., the computers] can be programmed to check for each pos-
sible strategy combination whether it constitutes an equilibrium."
How does a computer, whether based on recursion theory or constructive mathematics,
￿ check￿for an equilibrium which is provably uncomputable and non-constructive?
22and continuing research ￿without complete resolution ￿on the issue of structural
stability in dynamical systems. Otherwise, they would not claim (p. 317)39:
"[T]here is no straightforward procedure for testing for robustness
with respect to small changes in parameter values in analytical mod-
els."
However, even if they knew anything about the deep results (and non-results)
in structural stability for dynamical systems, it would not be comfortable for
them to be told that ([1], pp. 120-1; underlined emphasis in the original):
"The ubiquity of structurally unstable motions .... suggests that
structural stability is not an appropriate concept for experimental
systems. .... Here we may hazard a conjecture: all natural systems
are dynamically stable. In fact, we will probably evolve the de￿nition
of stability until this conjecture becomes true."
L&K, in particular, especially because they never really distinguish between
static and dynamic stability, and the kinds of dynamical systems in which sta-
bility plays any role, and the subtle di⁄erences in the kind of correspondence
principle ([115], pp. 5 & 258, ⁄) ￿a component of which is comparative statics
￿one can invoke, they would not understand how to make sense of Leontief￿ s
characteristically perceptive observation ([50], p. 68; italics added):
"Professor Leontief does not accept [that instability is an unrealistic
hypothesis] and maintains that we may utilize dynamical systems
that are unstable throughout and cites capitalism as an example.￿
The question, then, is: whether dynamic economics (aggregative or not),
modelled as a (nonlinear) dynamical system, is a natural system (Abraham),
an experimental system (Abraham) or an empirical system (Leontief)? There
is no apriori reason for any of these kinds of dynamical systems to be stable
for observational, simulational or experimental purposes ([104]) ￿especially also
since it is easy to show that only dynamical systems incapable of being under-
pinned by any notion of maximization ([117], p. 12) are capable of computation
universality and, hence, consistent with the standard assumption of rationality
in economics. These are among some of the reasons why the L&K discussions
of comparative statics and robustness are both less than useful and highly mis-
leading.
39Their whole discussion of ￿ robustness￿ , ￿ sensitivity￿and ￿ comparative statics￿ , in economics,
is replete with the same kind of embarrassing infelicities as the ones we have catalogued and
discussed above. We refrain from going into further details on these particular issues because
we have just realized ￿after the ￿rst draft of this paper was completed ￿that the authors, with
an additional co-author ([69]), seem to have recently embarked on an adventure in Economics
as Robustness Analysis. We will have to reserve our critique of the issue of robustness analysis,
and related concepts, as presented by these authors, for a di⁄erent exercise. Su¢ ce it to say
that ￿ as in the case of the embarrassing ignorance of structural stability - the many and
varied allusions to ￿ comparative statics￿in this paper are mostly without substance. The one
attempted ￿ formalization￿of ￿ robustness￿ , on pp. 316-7, is a tissue of formal confusion.
23The analysis, discussions and explanations in section 4 of L&K, pp. 318-321,
are particularly obscure, when not outright incorrect. To being with, what is a
￿ digital proof ￿ 40 being contrasted with? The context of their discussion suggests
that the alternative is a so-called ￿ analytical proof￿ . If they mean by a ￿ digital
proof￿ , those theorems that are provable by programming a digital computer,
then every analytical proof, say in standard textbooks on constructive analysis
([7], [8] or [9])41 is a digital proof. If by proof they mean, say, those sanctioned
by intuitionistic logic only, then every reference to ￿ proof￿in their paper, and
all of the ￿ proofs￿of theorems derived within the neowalrasian code, fail to be
acceptable. Even if not underpinned by intuitionistic logic, in many varieties of
constructive analysis ￿for example in [7] ￿no appeal will be made to the tertium
non datur in cases where in￿nitary instances have to be considered. Hence, any
proof of a neowalrasian theorem, derived with appeal to the Bolzano-Weierstrass
theorem, cannot and will not be considered a valid proof existence. Surely, the
authors must know that both the Nash equilibrium, as derived by John Nash,
and the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, are theorems whose proofs are based on the
Brouwer42 (or Kakutani) ￿xed point theorem, whose proof invoked the Bolzano-
Weierstrass theorem.
So, what do L&K mean by ￿ proof￿ . L&K do point out that (p. 319; italics
added):
"[A] computer program could be seen as a kind of logico-mathematical
argument, albeit a particularly long and tedious one."
We will have to assume that proof, according to L&K, is a ￿ logico-mathematical
argument￿ . Now, every valid computer program is a ￿ kind of logico-mathematical
argument￿ , but what kind of logic and which branch of mathematics underpins a
computer program? We have, in earlier paragraphs, belaboured this point with
mention of constructive mathematics, recursion theory and intuitionistic logic.
In this precise sense, therefore, every computer program is a proof in a strict
mathematical sense. However, they go on to ￿ spoil￿this useful observation ￿of
40The title of section 4 is: ￿ What is Wrong with Digital Proofs?￿This is the only occurrence
of the phrase ￿ digital proof￿in L&K. Hence we have to infer what is meant from the context,
by interpreting, appropriately, phrases such as (p. 319):
".. consider the implications of the possible di⁄erences between analytical and
computerized proofs."
Note, however, that ￿ a computerized proof￿can be perfectly analytic, depending on what
one means by ￿ analytic￿ .
41See also the elegant and illuminative discussion on Algorithm in Modern Mathematics
and Computer Science by Donald Knuth ([70]), where he states unambiguously (p. 94):
"The interesting thing about [Bishop￿ s Constructive mathematics] is that it reads
essentially like ordinary mathematics, yet it is entirely algorithmic in nature if
you look between the lines."
42Of course Brouwer did derive, forty years after he ￿rst derived the non-constructive version
of the ￿xed point theorem that bears his name, a ￿xed point theorem based on intuitionistic
logic, that had the express aim of avoiding any reliance on the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem
(see the ￿rst footnote in [14]).
24￿ a computer program could be seen as a .. logico-mathematical argument￿ , by
a stunted appeal to Tymoczko￿ s discussion of ￿ surveyability￿of proofs ([149]).
Tymoczko suggests (ibid, p. 59) three characteristics of proof: that they should
be convincing, surveyable and formalizable. He, then goes on to claim that sur-
veyability and formalizability ￿ are the deep features [of a proof]￿ , and that (p.
61-62; italics added):
"It is because proofs are surveyable and formalizable that they are
convincing to rational agents.
Surveyability and formalizability can be seen as two sides of the same
coin. .... Can there be surveyable proofs that are not formalizable
or formal proofs that cannot be surveyed? Are all surveyable proofs
formalizable? .... Given any su¢ ciently rich theory, we can ￿nd a
surveyable proof of a statement of that theory which has no formal
proof. ...
Are all formalizable proofs surveyable? ... Here the answer is an
easy no.
However, if we stop to think about this situation, it appears unlikely
that this logical possibility can ever be realized. ....
In summary, although formal proofs outrun surveyable proofs, it
is not at all obvious that mathematicians could come across for-
mal proofs and recognize them as such without being able to survey
them."
However, one cannot let these interesting remarks pass unchallenged! First
of all, who or what is a ￿ rational agent￿? It is entirely conceivable ￿and formally
demonstrable (see, for example, [106], [152], especially chapter 3, and [160], es-
pecially parts II & IV) ￿that an e⁄ective characterization of the behaviour of
a rational agent in the sense of economic theory is formally equivalent to the
computing activity of a Turing Machine. Next, Tymoczko is admirably clear
in de￿ning the concept of formalizability and formal proof ￿both by appealing
to results in model and proof theory and to G￿del numberings of formal proofs
considered as mathematical objects ￿but does not de￿ne or characterize the
meaning ￿formal or not ￿of surveyability! In the case of surveyability he ￿
and L&K ￿fallback on intuitive concepts such as ￿ rational agents￿ , humanly
surveyable￿ , ￿ recognize￿ , and so on. Suppose, however, Tymoczko (and L&K)
did formally de￿ne or characterize formally the notion of surveyability, in the
same sense in which the intuitive notion of e⁄ective calculability was encap-
sulated in the formal notion of a Turing Machine or the ￿-calculus, or partial
recursive functions ￿all formally equivalent to each other by the Church-Turing
Thesis. Then, it will be possible to show that a rational agent will not be able to
recognize as surveyable the proof of some theorems by appealing to the Halting
Problem for Turing Machines. Tymoczko￿ s admirable and informal discussion is
valid ￿formally, of course ￿only on the basis of an invalid asymmetry between
his way of de￿ning, implicitly, the notion of formalizability and formal proofs,
25but leaving to the intuitive domain the characterization of surveyability. This
makes the rest of his ￿ philosophical￿arguments against accepting the Appel-
Haken proof of the four-colour theorem much less than formally convincing.
A fortiori, therefore, L&K￿ s appeal to them for their loose case against con-
sidering ￿ computer-assisted proofs￿as ￿ mathematical proofs￿ . There are many
other ways we can cast seriously rigorous doubts against Tymoczko￿ s and L&K￿ s
loose, allegedly philosophical, arguments against considering ￿ computer-assisted
proofs￿as ￿ mathematical proofs￿ , but this must su¢ ce for the moment43.Within
this context of the discussion of computer-aided proofs, L&K have thoughts
on ￿ program veri￿cation￿ but fail to state exactly what they mean by ￿ program
veri￿cation￿ 44. It is not as if there are no rigorous, formal, de￿nitions, even in
graduate textbooks with impeccable credentials ([24], comes to mind at once; see
p. 536). However, a serious discussion of program veri￿cation, to substantiate
the kind of loose assertion in L&K, requires much more depth and understand-
ing of the issue, for example as in Platek￿ s crystal clear, almost pedagogic, yet
deep, article ([103]).
They claim (p. 319; italics added) that the:
"[C]onsensus view concerning program veri￿cation seems to be that
it is, in principle, possible to check any program for errors, but
that it may be prohibitively arduous or even humanly impossible
to do so. .... It is thus possible to construct logical proofs of
program correctness. In practice, such proofs are seldom presented
... because they are complex, boring and usually their presentation
43Almost everything that L&K write on ￿ program veri￿cation￿ , in this context, never rises
above the trivial, and even the banal. They are, very clearly, without any grounding in the rich
and burgeoning literature on ￿ program veri￿cation￿and their inherent formal undecidabilities.
Here, too, they get away with loose claims, referring to even looser references, simply because
they do not bother to state clearly ￿ i.e., formally ￿ exactly what they mean by ￿ program
veri￿cation￿ . On the other hand, every time they do try to de￿ne any concept ￿ rigorously￿ ,
they trip over them and on them and make a mess of their claims, anyway. For example, it is all
very well to refer to ￿ De Millo, Lipton and Perlis, 1979￿([27]), on p. 319, when suggesting that
￿ program veri￿cation￿is an academically and ￿nancially unrewarding exercise. Quite apart
from this being untrue ￿the ￿nancial and academic rewards for usable results on ￿ program
veri￿cation￿are considerable, given their importance in cryptology, patent codi￿cation, and
other similar security related ￿elds ￿one would have expected L&K to refer also to the counter-
argument to [27], given with pungency and clarity by Fetzer ([33], p.1062; italics added):"The
fact that one or more persons of saintly disposition might sacri￿ce themselves to the tedium of
eternal veri￿cation of tens of millions of lines of code for the bene￿t of the human race is beside
the point. The limitations involved here are not merely practical. ..... In maintaining that
program veri￿cation cannot succeed as a generally applicable and completely reliable method
of guaranteeing the performance of a program, De Millo, Lipton and Perlis thus arrived at the
right conclusion for the wrong reasons." Actually, however, the nuanced discussion in [27] is
far richer and more persuasive than the caricature of the message in it summarized by L&K.
44Except to state that (p.319):
"It is also, in principle, possible to check computer codes for errors because from
the syntactic perspective the code is comparable to mathematical symbolism."
They forget ￿or, more likely, do not know - that program veri￿cation is a part of denota-
tional semantics (see [24]). But even if we grant them this ￿ de￿nition￿ , what is the scope of
￿ comparable￿?
26does not provide the author with much in terms of academic prestige
or ￿nancial gain." "
Apart from this being a false claim, what exactly do they mean by ￿ humanly
possible￿ , ￿ logical proofs￿ or ￿ complex￿? Suppose the logic in question is intu-
itionistic logic and the mathematics in which a proof is devised in constructive,
then the validity of the proof is equivalent to the validity of the program. And,
would they include among allowable humanly possible processes, in this con-
text, those of the ￿ six-and-thirty of the (forty) lads, employed by a Professor
at the Grand Academy of Lagado, described with wit and venom by Swift, in
Gulliver￿ s Voyage to Laputa ([135], pp. 213-4):
"To read the several lines softly as they appeared upon the frame;
and where they found three or four words together that might make
part of a sentence, they dictated to the four remaining boys, who
were scribes. This work was repeated three or four times; and at
every turn, the engine was so contrived that the words shifted into
new places, as the square bots of wood moved upside down. Six
hours a day the young students were employed in this labour; and
the professor showed me several volumes in large folio already col-
lected of broken sentences, which he intended to piece together, and
out of these rich materials to give the world a complete body of all
arts and sciences; which, however, might be still improved and much
expedited, if the public would raise a fund for making and employ-
ing ￿ve hundred such frames in Lagado, and oblige the managers to
contribute in common their several collections."
And, would they ￿L&K ￿please also specify the time horizon of ￿ humanly
possible￿! After all, the purveyors of the perfect model of economics, those
in the neowalrasian cloisters, have no compunction about employing rational
agents who decide over in￿nite horizons, in an ￿ as if￿world, of course. But that
is part of living in Cantor￿ s Paradise, in which the neowalrasian cloisters are
situated.
Thus we disagree quite profoundly with the utterly unsubstantiated claim
by L&K, that (p. 320):
" It goes without saying that program veri￿cation is more di¢ cult
in practice than verifying an analytical proof: there are simply more
factors that can go humanly wrong."
Apart from this repeated appeal to something unde￿ned called ￿ humanly￿
repeatedly, we ￿in our human, intellectual, capacity ￿would be very happy to
provide, for every ￿ di¢ cult in practice￿computer-aided proof (or ￿ digital proof￿ ,
if L&K give a formal de￿nition of this term, as one about non-constructive ￿ an-
alytical proofs￿ ), an equally di¢ cult ￿ analytical proof￿ , constructed by ordinary
human beings, that has gone wrong, quite seriously. Here, too, then, we must
rely on ￿ one or more persons of saintly dispositions￿to ￿ sacri￿ce themselves to
27the tedium of eternal veri￿cation￿of the validity of ￿ analytical proofs￿!45 Just
o⁄ the cu⁄, we have in mind something that is of concern for us in our own
research on economic dynamics: the (in)famous example of Dulac￿ s Theorem,
claiming to have ￿ proved￿a theorem contributing to the resolution of the second
part of the 16th of Hilbert￿ s famous 23 Problems46. It was published by Dulac
in 1923; it was only more than half a century later, that the errors in the original
proofs by Dulac were corrected, by Yulij Ilyashenko, and, independently, by J.
P. ￿calle47 (see, for example, [31]48, [100], chapter 3 and [65]).
More pertinently, we would like to provide two examples of ￿ computer-aided￿
proofs, both executed with full cognizance of the di¢ culty of program veri￿ca-
tion but, at the same time, with rigorous and transparent criteria explicitly
made, to make sure that any ￿ factors￿that ￿ can go humanly wrong￿can be de-
tected and corrected, if anyone wishes to do so. But more importantly, the ￿rst
example shows the intimate way mathematical theory, experimental simulation
and deep numerical analysis was brought to bear to resolve a long-standing
paradox. The ￿rst is the very recent proof of the existence of the Lorenz At-
tractor ([146]). In 1985, no less an authority on dynamical systems theory than
Morris Hirsch observed, for the Lorenz System49 ([62], p. 191; second set of
italics added):
"[C]haotic behaviour has not been proved. As far as I am aware,
practically nothing has been proved about this particular system. ...
It is of no particular importance to answer this question; but the lack
of an answer is a sharp challenge to dynamicists, and considering all
the attention paid to this system, it is something of a scandal."
In the same volume in which Hirsch￿ s article appeared, another distinguished
dynamical system theorist, Ralph Abraham, added his nuanced opinion ￿in
softer phrases ￿to this ￿ scandal￿([1], p. 117; italics added):
45Witness the brouhaha surrounding the recent claim by Vinay Deolalikar ￿ in no less a
medium that the World Wide Web! ￿that he had solved one of the Clay Millennium Problems,
that of resolving the P ?
=NP conundrum. One supposes that his claim was motivated entirely
by a sense of intellectual achievement; but the hundreds who seem to have engaged themselves
in ￿ verifying￿the validity of the proofs are obviously of a ￿ Saintly Disposition￿!
46The second part of Hilbert￿ s 16th Problem remains unsolved, to this day.
47Incidentally, ￿calle￿ s proof of Dulac￿ s conjecture was constructive (see [32]).
48We must confess that we have never actually read the original by Dulac, mainly because
neither of us are capable of reading any intricate mathematical text in French. Our own
favourite text on this problem, which also gives a complete report on the rich Chinese tradition
of research in this area, is the monograph by Ye Yan-Qian and his many collaborators, [168].
49The Lorenz System is as follows:
dx
dt
= ￿10x + 10y
dy
dt







28"The chaotic attractor of mathematical theory began with Birkho⁄
in 1916. The chaotic attractor of simulation experiment arrived with
Lorenz in 1962. .. The identi￿cation of these two objects has not
yet succeeded, despite many attempts during the past twenty years.
Of course, everyone (including myself) expects this to happen soon
.. ."
However, Abraham￿ s own take on the ￿ scandal￿was expressed in another way,
a little further down (p.118; underlined phrase in the original, italics added):
"However, most of the time experimentalists observe not braids (ra-
tionally related frequencies) but quasi-periodic motions (apparently
irrationally related frequencies). That is the quasi-periodic paradox.
More than one scientists has lost faith in mathematics because of the
ubiquity of this illegal motion in the natural world."
The most interesting point here is that the ￿ scientist lost faith in mathe-
matics￿because it was not able to make sense of the simulation experimental-
ists observation. L&K, would claim, justi￿ably, we think, in this case, that
the economists in the neowalrasian cloisters ￿their perfect model economists ￿
would ￿ lose faith in the simulation experimentalists observation￿!
Now, the Lorenz system is the paradigmatic repository of the property that
almost characterizes so-called chaotic dynamical systems: sensitive dependence
on initial conditions (SDIC). In such a system, then, what can L&K mean with
(p.320; italics added):
"[I]n discretizations it is necessary to check that the computer model
is presented in exactly the same way as the analytical model upon
which it is based."
Since L&K require the ￿ presentation￿to be to ￿presumably ￿a digital com-
puter, ￿ discretization￿presupposes that the ￿ analytical model upon which it is
based￿is continuous in some rigorous, well-de￿ned, sense. However, what does
￿ exactly the same way￿mean? Do they mean the ￿ presentation￿of the ￿ analytical
model￿is to be in its original continuous form? For example, in the above case
of the Lorenz system, are they expecting the analyst, experimenter, simulator
or whoever, to be able to use the digital computer to faithfully replicate the
dynamics of the continuous time-space Lorenz system￿ s nonlinear dynamics ￿
SDIC and all ￿￿ exactly the same way￿? But no serious experimenter, simula-
tor, numerical analyst, or even a mathematically competent dynamical system
theorist, would forget that the digital computer has its own way of truncating
￿oating point representation of real numbers, depending on its internal, built-in,
precision. A system of nonlinear equations, such as Lorenz￿ s, susceptible to the
problems of SDIC, cannot, therefore, almost by de￿nition be represented ￿ ex-
actly the same way￿ , if we interpret the phrase in its obvious, intuitive, way (for
lack of a formal de￿nition).
29On the other hand, suppose we interpret ￿ exactly the same way￿to mean
that the numerical method that is implemented on the digital computer to sim-
ulate, experiment with, or analyse, the Lorenz system, should be mathematically
equivalent to it, then we must ask what ￿ mathematical equivalence￿entails. This
is one kind of frontier research in the interface between nonlinear dynamics and
theoretical numerical analysis, elegantly summarised in ([133]).
Another way to make sense of this thorny issue of ￿ exactly the same way￿
would be to construct a Turing Machine equivalent of, in this case, the Lorenz
system. Then, of course, the question becomes: What is the meaning of ￿ Turing
Machine equivalent? Again, a precise answer can be given (as one of us has tried,
over the years and in many of his writings; cf, for example, [152] and [151]), so
that one circumvents the pitfalls of discretizations and the rounding errors due
to the computer￿ s internal ￿ oating point representations and truncations.
Finally, there is the fairly straightforward alternative of using Interval Analy-
sis ( cf., [88]) for the numerical method that is implemented in the digital com-
puter to analyse, experiment or simulate the continuous time-space system, in
this case, of course, the Lorenz system. It is this alternative that is chosen in
Tucker￿ s computer-aided proof of the existence of the Lorenz attractor ([146],
especially pp. 1200-11).
But, surely, the existence of the Lorenz Attractor should be a classic an-
alytical proof ￿perhaps utilizing one or another (non-constructive) ￿x point
theorem? Why, then, this preoccupation with ￿ discretizations￿and ￿ presenta-
tions of exactly the same model￿to a digital computer? For the same reasons
that the proof of the four-colour theorem was achieved by Appel and Haken
with the aid of a digital computer (see, for accessible, but quite complete de-
tails, [114], chapter 3). The parallels are even more than just the recourse to a
digital computer to evaluate complex numerical calculations. In [146] (p. 1199),
he begins with a classic mathematical method of an Ansatz, an intuitive hunch,
which will, hopefully, be con￿rmed by the results of the complete analysis and
necessary evaluations. The intuitive hunch is not a frivolous guess; it is an ed-
ucated guess of the right starting point, based on a thorough knowledge of all
possible aspects of an unsolved problem - in this case that of ￿nding a correspon-
dence between a mathematical object and an experimentally discovered one. In
Tucker￿ s Ansatz, normal form theory is combined with rigorously implemented
digital computations are brought to bear on getting the desired ￿nal result. In
deriving the normal form, an analytic change of coordinates leads to a classic
small divisor problem, which to complete a necessary element of the analytic
proof requires the numerical evaluation of 19,386 low-order divisors50. It is here
that the ￿ computer-aided￿part of the proof acts as a ￿ scratch pad￿ .
Correspondingly, it is possible to identify the Ansatz in the Appel-Haken
proof: it is a particularly well-informed probabilistic argument establishing,
50The knowledgeable reader would immediately recognize the similarity with the origins
of what eventually became the celebrated Kolmogorov-Arnold-Moser (KAM ) theorem in dy-
namical systems theory. Small divisors, quasi-periodic orbits, perturbations (of Hamiltonians)
￿all issues we have had to mention in our various discussions, above ￿play signi￿cant parts
in the motivation and the eventual formalization Kolmogorov￿ s original conjecture.
30with almost absolute certainty that51 ([114], p. 83; italics added):
"[T]here must exist some discharging procedure producing an un-
avoidable set all of whose con￿gurations are reducible. That is, they
showed that the computer-assisted reducibility proof was overwhelm-
ingly likely to succeed ..."
And proceeded to do just that! Of course, they, too, could have emulated
the Professor in the Academy at Lagado, in case the purists preferred a dozen
Ramanujams or a few thousand ordinary computing geniuses to do the com-
putations for producing the ￿ unavoidable set all of whose con￿gurations are
reducible.￿
However, in these kinds of hybrid proofs, where the analytic (usually non-
constructive) and the numerical or combinatorial elements are brought to bear
upon a procedure or a thought-experiment, the dividing line between the domain
of the two has to be carefully distinguished. In Tucker￿ s case, (1199) ￿ a change
of variables ... in a small cube centered at the origin, transforms the Lorenz
equations ... into a carefully selected normal form... Inside the cube, we can
then estimate the evolution of trajectories analytically, and thereby we avoid
the problem of having to use the computers in regions where the ￿ow times are
unbounded.￿ The construction of the small cube, via the change of variables,
entails ￿ an analytic change of coordinates￿ , which ..introduces a small divisor
problem￿ , all 19, 386 of them, which then necessitates recourse to a digital
computer and to interval analysis to compute, numerically, their estimates.
Of course, Tucker, also, could have emulated the Professor at Lagado and
hired a few thousand ￿ rational agents￿with exceptional computing abilities ￿
perhaps a few dozen Ramanujams would have been su¢ cient ￿to dispense with
the dreaded, program-unveri￿able, digital computer. Mercifully, the versatile
Tucker wrote a ￿ small C-program, smalldiv.c￿ (ibid, p. 1200) to estimate
these small divisors.
An illustration of this point is made in Ruelle￿ s report of one of Oscar Land-
ford￿ s computer-aided proofs ([112], p. 100)52:
"My colleague Oscar Landford reported once on a theorem [whose]
proofs [was] computer aided, which means that it consists of some
mathematical preliminaries and then a computer program. The pro-
gram (or code) uses interval arithmetic to check various inequalities;
if these are found to be correct, the theorem is proved. The com-
plications of the problem forced Landford to write a relatively long
program, about 200 pages. .... Oscar Landford is a very careful
51Having ￿rst produced 1936 reducible con￿gurations, at least one of which had to occur in
any planar triangulation.
52In the spirit of complete honesty and candour with which we have written this paper, in
fairness to the sceptics of the mathematical purity of computer-aided proofs, we must inform
the reader the following fact. The continuation of the above quoted paragraph by Ruelle
may be ￿ rather disheartening￿to people like us, who believe that such proofs are on an equal
footing, mathematically, to so-called ￿ analytical proofs￿ .
31person, and he took pains to check that, when the code is fed into
the computer, the computer does exactly what it is supposed to do.
In this manner ￿after the computer has agreed with the inequalities
in the code ￿the proof of the theorem is complete."
Scarf￿ s elegant, clear and complete exposition of the genesis of the CGE
research program ([118]), admirable though it is ￿and resides as the core foun-
tainhead of the genesis of the core of current orthodoxy in the neowalrasian
cloisters, the Real Business Cycle (RBC) model￿ s Recursive Competitive Equi-
librium (RCE) ￿simply does not confront the con￿ ict between the analytical
and the constructive or the computable domains. The interplay between the
analytical and the numerical was bridged by the Uzawa equivalence theorem
and the parallels with discharging procedures, unavoidable sets and reducibility
can be identi￿ed with the construction of a speci￿c sequence of primitive sets,
replacement operations, labelling, etc. In fact, a study of the precise nature of
the computer-aided nature of the establishment of Scarf￿ s Theorem (ibid, p. 45,
Theorem 2.5.1) and its utilization in demonstrating the original Brouwer ￿xed
point theorem would be the starting point for a way to reduce the remaining
indeterminacy in this research program (p. 51): the constructive or computable
determination of ￿ a convergent subsequence of subsimplices... which tend in the
limit to a single vector x￿.￿The missing link is an imaginative Ansatz53. In its
absence, the CGE program, followed by its uncritical application by the AGE
practitioners and, then, taken up even more uncritically by the RBC theorists,
remains un￿nished because ([118]), p. 52:
"The passage to the limit is the nonconstructive aspect of Brouwer￿ s
theorem, and we have no assurance that the subsimplices determined
by a ￿ne grid of vectors on [the price simplex] contains or is even
close to a true ￿xed point of the mapping."
Yet the whole program has been accepted as having been successful in de-
termining constructive and computable methods to locate Walrasian equilibria,
proved to exist by Arrow and Debreu, of course, non-constructively. This magic
transformation of a non-constructively derived uncomputable equilibrium, via
an algorithm that appeals to an undecidable disjunction during its execution,
is uncritically accepted by the inhabitants of the neowalrasian cloisters and is
taken to de￿ne ￿implicitly, of course ￿the ￿ perfect model￿of the economist.
No wonder, then, that this kind of economist ￿ shuns computation￿ ; he or she
knows, perhaps, instinctively, that there is no point in simulating anything,
using a non-constructive algorithm, to ￿nd an uncomputable equilibrium
53The Ansatz will have to ￿nd a way either to avoid any appeal to the Bolzano-Weierstrass
theorem or to work directly with constructive mathematics without undecidable disjunctions.
In fact, Brouwer￿ s Intuitionistically corrected proof of his original theorem ([14]) is the solution
- but only if the foundations of the theory developed in the neowalrasian cloisters is redone
in terms of constructive mathematics. Our own intuition is that ordinary economic theory,
formalized on N; Q; or Z, would avoid reliance on ￿x point theorems for the proof of equilibrium
and, hence, would be amenable to a fruitful interaction of the analytic and the combinatorial
to prove, with the aid of the digital computer, the existence of an equilibrium.
32Finally, it may well be apposite to remind L&K another aspect of computer-
aided proofs ￿the candour and care with which those who appeal to the com-
puter, at any particular stage of a proof, make available the codes and the kind
of Ansatz that may have forced them to seek the aid of the computer, so that
any interested person could repeat, check or whatever, the procedures adopted
in the interface and by the computer. How many analytical proofs are made
transparent in this way ￿particularly in the neowalrasian cloisters? How many
years has it taken ￿and continues to take ￿to ￿ prove￿Ramanujam￿ s results?
We learn nothing from section 4 of L&K, from any point of view: economics,
computer-aided proofs, program veri￿cation, digital proofs, discretizations, an-
alytical proof, ￿ humanly￿this or ￿ humanly￿that, computerized proofs, or robust-
ness, all concepts freely, enthusiastically and frivolously thrown around, with no
anchoring anything, especially in anything like any kind of theory, experiment
or simulation.
5 The Noble Tradition of Simulation in Eco-
nomics
"My guess is that the age of theorems may be passing and that of
simulation is approaching. Of course there will always be logical
matters to sort out, and our present expertise will not be totally
obsolete. But the task we set ourselves after the last war, to deduce
all that was required from a number of axioms, has almost been com-
pleted, and while not worthless has only made a small contribution
to our understanding."
[54], p. 258;italics added.
It is gratifying to note one of the high priests of the neowalrasian code54
heralding the ￿ age of simulations￿ . But the claim that it is possible to ￿ deduce
all that was required from a number of axioms￿ , whether it was the ￿ task￿that
the primitives of the neowalrasian cloisters set themselves as explicit aims or
not, is impossible to substantiate with any kind of rigour. Above all, it is
impossible to do so without also specifying clearly what ￿ deduce￿means; i.e.,
which deductive methods are allowable, mathematically and from the point of
view of whichever kind of mathematical logic is chosen to underpin the deductive
method. Moreover, who knows ￿or can ever know, epistemologically ￿whether
the chosen ￿ number of axioms￿was sensible, meaningful or relevant from any
economic vantage point. Surely, a strong case can be made that many of the
chosen axioms were done so for purely mathematical ￿of a particular variety
￿ reasons. In any case, what kind of ￿ understanding￿ does Hahn mean- or,
rather, the practitioners of the neowalrasian code mean? This latter question,
indirectly, is addressed, obviously, to L&K, whose norm of a perfect model of
economics is nothing other than the neowalrasian code.
54Clower￿ s de￿ning works of the neowalrasian code included, apart from the classics of
Arrow-Debreu, the books by Debreu ([26]) and Arrow & Hahn ([3]).
33However, in an ￿ unguarded address￿ , in Clower￿ s classic phrase ([16], p. 821),
Hahn also re￿ ected, in his Econometric Society Presidential Address of 1968,
ruefully (we hope), [53], pp. 1-2 (italics added):
"We all know the endless variety of adjustment models, not uncon-
genial to commonsense, one is capable of constructing. No unifying
principle, such as maximization, seems available; ..... The achieve-
ments of economic theory in the last two decades are both impressive
and in many ways beautiful. But it cannot be denied that there is
something scandalous in the spectacle of so many people re￿ning the
analyses of economic states which they give no reason to suppose will
ever, or have ever, come about. It probably is also dangerous."
Here is the crux of the matter as to why simulation is actually shunned by
the neowalrasian cloisters: simulation models, unless they are underpinned by
equilibrium models that are, in turn, built on maximization principles ￿whether
in competitive markets or not is besides the point; whether in game theoretic
situations or not is irrelevant ￿can only be utilized to compute equilibria in
the precise sense in which it is used in RBC models (cf. [18], especially §4 &
§5), and at least in this L&K are right, but for the wrong reasons. But what if
one can prove ￿analytically, no less ￿that only dynamical systems incapable of
being consistent with any maximum principle can be underpinned by a rigorous
computable formulation of bounded rationality and satis￿cing in the strict sense
in which Simon de￿ned them? What if, moreover, there is a unifying principle,
underpinned by the conjunction between computability theory and dynamical
systems theory that can, in turn, generate dynamical systems incapable of be-
ing made consistent by any maximization principle55? Indeed, there does exist
such a unifying principle, far more general, for dynamical systems, yet rigor-
ously underpinned by computability theory: computation universality. In other
words, dynamical systems capable of computation universality are incapable of
being made consistent with any maximization principle, yet they are consistent
with Simonian bounded rationality and satis￿cing. These systems, in general,
can only be explored, investigated and analyzed for their dynamic behaviour,
in anything beyond the ultra-short-term, by simulation models that are com-
putably based. It is not possible to use the kind of mathematics to which the
neowalrasian code adheres, separating and employing one kind for their analyt-
ical part and another for the simulation part. Thus, there cannot be and there
will be no need for the dichotomy between an analytical part of a proof of a
property of a system and a computer-aided part. Some of the relevant results
can be found in our very recent research results, although built upon a series of
investigations going back to the founding of the ￿eld of Computable Economics,
about twenty years ago (cf. [161] and [173]).
This is the reason why in our discussion of the noble tradition of simulation in
economics we concentrate exclusively on varieties of disequilibrium approaches
55See, above, for the impeccable source for this insight in economics, as usual, made ￿rst
by Paul Samuelson, in his Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture ([117], pp. 12-13).
34to economic dynamics, the latter, however, interpreted in a very particular
sense: the concentration on understanding the properties of a path
towards an equilibrium, whether such an end state is de￿nable or
reachable or not. In the next three subsections we summarize the noble
tradition of simulation in economics via the epistemological and methodological
roles played by simulation and computing in: indeterminate nonlinear dynamics,
coupled linear dynamics, evolutionary dynamics and behavioural dynamics.
Before we end the ￿ prologue￿to this section it is necessary to mention yet
another red herring thrown out by L&K. They claim, ostensibly correctly, that:
"The dearth of simulations models is most conspicuous in the most
widely respected journal that publish papers on economic theory."
L&K, p. 305; italics added.
Why is this surprising? After all, it is precisely in economic theory ￿where
the ￿ perfect model￿rules in the form of the neowalrasian code ￿that there is
no need for simulation, as argued by L&K, themselves! This kind of pointless
pointing out comes about because, we surmise, L&K do not understand exactly
what a simulation is ￿theoretically, above all, but also epistemologically, al-
though their paper is liberal in invoking epistemics all over the place ￿and,
even worse, what exactly is the meaning of economic theory and how a variety
of closures determine exactly what foundations for which economics dominates
the vision of orthodoxy in any one epoch. It is not as if the current orthodoxy
￿particularly in macroeconomics ￿has been the ruling paradigm, even of the
recent past.
They continue the above sentence as follows (italics in the original):
"A quick search for papers with ￿ simulation￿in the title yielded a
total of 47 hits in JSTOR and 112 hits in the Web of Knowledge for
the ￿ve journals commonly considered the most prestigious: Ameri-
can Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, Econometrica,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Review of Economic Studies."
￿ Commonly considered most prestigious￿by economic theorists, experimental
economists and applied economists, which would appear to exhaust the category
of economists employed at the leading Universities, some of the better known
International Institutions ￿for example the World Bank, IMF, OECD, the var-
ious UN a¢ liates ￿and even Central Banks and the treasury-linked Ministries
of Finance, etc. But this is a jaundiced vision for a very simple reason: many
faculties of economics contain departments of management56, business and oper-
ations research, in short the decision sciences, broadly interpreted. Conversely,
56We are both members of the Department of Economics of the Faculty of Economics
at the University of Trento. The Faculty, itself, is made up of our department and the
department of management and operations research. In fact, we were ￿ inspired￿to embark on
this essay because a colleague in the sister department asked us whether we were aware of
L&K, knowing our own adherence to a belief in, and respect for, the role of simulation intrinsic
to computable economics. Unfortunately, this colleague ￿to the best of our knowledge ￿had
no better command of economics, mathematics or epistemology than that which has been
demonstrated in L&K.
35many distinguished economists belong to Schools, Faculties and Departments of
Business. Just o⁄ the cu⁄, the Stern School of Business at NYU, the Anderson
Graduate School of Management at UCLA, the Graduate School of Business
at the University of Chicago, the London Business School, the Judge Busi-
ness School at Cambridge University,and the Haas School of Business at UC
Berkeley, come to mind - not to mention the great tradition of decision sciences
nurtured and fostered by what is now the Carnegie Mellon University, Herbert
Simon￿ s home base for most of his academic life. For members of these kinds of
schools, faculties and departments, it is not clear the above ￿ve journals would
be ￿ considered￿unambiguously ￿ the most prestigious￿ . In particular, journals in
management, business, operations research and statistics would be equally -
or, most likely, more ￿prestigious, in terms of promotion and tenure for young
academics. Again an o⁄ the cu⁄ check on "hits in JSTOR" for "papers with
￿ simulation￿in the title" of Journals that would count as prestigious for econo-
mists with a business, ￿nance, OR and related decision science orientation, gave
us between 800 and 840 hits, depending on the permutations and combinations
of the Journals chosen57. In this particular context, given that we have included
the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA in our ￿ hits list
search￿ , it may be useful and apposite to point out to L&K that three of De-
breu￿ s fundamental papers that led to the famous Arrow-Debreu classic and,
then, to Debreu￿ s own de￿ning book, Theory of Value, [26], were published in
this journal; i.e., the de￿ning framework and foundations for the neowalrasian
code came to see their ￿rst public light of day in the Proceedings of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences of the USA. A similar story could be told for the
de￿ning tools of the dominant school of macroeconomics ￿the Newclassicals ￿
that were fashioned by Bellman, Kalman and Wald58. Ditto for the classics of
mathematical programming59.
If a lesson is to be learned from this kind of past, it is that the ￿ commonly
57We checked the following: The Journal of the Operations Research Society, Operations
Research, The Journal of Business, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the US,
Science, Management Science, mathematics of Operations Research, SIAM Journal on Applied
Mathematics, SIAM Review, SIAM Journal on Numerical Analysis, Journal of Business &
Economic Statistics, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A & Series B.
58Newclassical macroeconomics is often referred to ￿ especially by its core adherents and
practitioners ￿ as Recursive Macroeconomics ([77]). The reason for it being ￿ recursive￿ is,
ostensibly, due to the mathematical tools underpinning its formalization: Dynamic Program-
ming (Bellman), Kalman Filtering (Kalman) and Markov Decision Processes (Wald). Nat-
urally, as practitioners of Computable Macroeconomics we ￿nd the use of ￿ recursive￿by the
Newclassicals somewhat unfortunate. The foundations of computability theory, from its in-
ception in the late 1930s, lies in recursion theory in its mathematically rigorous sense.
59Indeed, this is particularly true of some of the classics by Richard Bellman on dynamic
programming. For example what is now routinely used and taught by economists (mostly, but
not exclusively of neowalrasian code persuasions) as the ￿ principle of optimality￿ , had one of
its incarnations, as the ￿ principle of invariant imbedding￿in the Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the USA in 1956. In passing, it should also be mentioned that many
classics of what de￿ned the neowalrasian code were also the product of a fertile period of
activity at RAND, and one of the classics was precisely on simulation. We have in mind the
1972 RAND monograph by Shubik and Brewer on Models, Simulation and Games - A Survey
([122]).
36considered most prestigious￿Journals, are good at consolidating what has be-
come orthodoxy; but they are, almost by de￿nition and necessity, oblivious to
challenges to orthodoxy, in the nascent period of the challenges.
Instead of prowling around title ￿ hits￿in so-called ￿ prestigious￿Journals, they
should have studied the way the subject of economics is pushing its frontiers with
new tools and concepts ￿some of which are being used by agent-based modellers,
again ￿rst emerging at the hands, from the brains, of Turing, von Neumann,
Ulam and Conway ￿in obvious synergies between computation, simulation and
dynamics.
A series of articles, from the last decade of the previous century, through to
the mid-point of the present decade, have been celebrating, and re￿ ecting on,
various anniversaries pertaining to OR and Simulation (a representative sample
would include, for example, [110], [91], [137], and [99]). There are many refer-
ences to citation indexes and the rich vein of information that can be garnered
from them, in a primitive inductive mode, about the way simulation modelling
has determined the evolution of many of the decision sciences that underpin
modern economic theory.
To claim that simulation has been shunned by economists only because it
has been ignored by precisely the kind of economic theory that has no need for
it is a non sequitur of the highest form of absurdity, in a paper replete with
many vintage absurdities.
In any case, this story, that economists never shunned simulation, can be
told in many di⁄erent ways, even emphasizing and invoking traditions that we
have chosen to neglect. However, we have endeavoured very explicitly to avoid
any reliance on the Whig approach to the telling of this story.
5.1 Economist￿ s Never ￿ Shunned Simulation￿
"Lundberg￿ s basic contribution to the ￿eld [of macroeconomic dy-
namics] does not make any use of the now commonplace mathemat-
ical tools that sometimes o⁄er general solutions to dynamic rela-
tionships; instead, it relies on numerical time sequences generated
with the aid of particular illustrative values of the parameters of his
dynamic equations. ... Indeed, it will be pointed out that the os-
tensible superiority of the formal approaches in terms of the greater
generality of their results is to a considerable degree an illusion, be-
cause the mathematical techniques are fully e⁄ective in providing
analytic solutions for dynamic models only when those models take
the most elementary (linear) forms. ... There are even signi￿cant
recent contributions60 that have reverted directly to the Lundbergian
60By these Baumol refers (ibid, p. 193) to the evolutionary growth theoretic tradition
pioneered by Nelson and Winter (op.cit), built on Schumpeterian foundations, and the problem
of traverse in the Neo-Austrian tradition, revived by John Hicks and imaginatively cast into a
simulation model by Mario Amendola and Jean-Luc Ga⁄ard ([2]). In both cases the emphasis
is on the path between equilibria, not the equilibria themselves. See §5.2, below.
37techniques, thereby demonstrating their power to provide profound
insights into complex and important issues."
[6], 1991, pp. 185-6; italics added.
This is just for starters, on the methodology advocated, and practised, by a
distinguished group of macroeconomists whose work was de￿nitive in de￿ning
the subject [158].
One can easily make a fairly good case that some of our classical and neo-
classical founding fathers were equally adept at relying on simulation to obtain
educated guesses for evolving patterns in both aggregative and disaggregated
economic variables, within equilibrium and non-equilibrium models. Malthus,
Jevons, Marshall, the Austrian capital theorists, even Irving Fisher, are names
that come to mind. Jevons, could be considered the successor of Babbage and
the precursor of Turing, in building and putting to use a primitive digital com-
puting machine to implement deductive processes and investigate empirical hy-
potheses ￿even of inferring, despite his penetrating critiques of Mill￿ s reliance on
induction (see chapter 15 in [160]). Fisher is, arguably, the ￿rst eminent econo-
mist to build and use an analogue computing machine to investigate and infer
values for microeconomic parameters, by a structured simulation model and
method (see [11]), to determine equilibrium prices and quantities. In Fisher￿ s
case, even though he could considered the precursor of Phillips, in that he con-
structed a special purpose hydraulic analogue computing machine for studying,
in a simulated environment, a theoretically informed model, he should also be
considered a precursor of the CGE school. In that sense, simulation was not for
the epistemological reason of learning about the analytical model. As Borges
reminded his readers: ￿ The fact is that every writer creates his own precursors.￿
It is not clear, however, that these distinguished precursors, and their Borge-
sian precursors, could be considered the founding fathers of simulation modelling
in the epistemological and methodological sense that we have suggested above,
at the end of the previous section. For that we have really to wait for the various
￿ revolutions￿￿macro, micro, interindustrial economics and game theory ￿of the
1930s. Above all, in macroeconomics, at the hands of the pioneering Swedes and
Frisch; in interindustrial economics ￿ironically as ￿ an empirical application of
equilibrium analysis￿￿and in varieties of competitive and non-competitive mi-
croeconomics, and also in dynamic game theory. But in the latter three cases ￿
microeconomics, interindustrial economics and game theory ￿simulation played
the role of the handmaiden to the analytical solution, as a method and means
to obtain conjectured, analytically predicted, solutions. This is exempli￿ed by
the classic works by Leontief ([74]), Chamberlin ([15]), Brown ([12]) and even
Flood ([35]). They may be ￿and, in some circles, are ￿considered the Bor-
gesian precursors of today￿ s experimental economics. But in macroeconomics
there was, from the beginning, a clear di⁄erence between simulation and its
epistemologies as a source for the development of macrodynamic theory and
macroeconometrics, considered the experimental wing of the subject, above all
in the works of Ragnar Frisch61 (see [38], [39] & [40]). This is, of course, clas-
61It is possible to include within Frisch￿ s contribution to simulation modelling, in the sense
38sically the case with Frisch￿ s Cassel Festschrift contribution, sadly ￿and quite
undeservedly and incorrectly ￿considered the fountainhead for the methodology
of the current dominant orthodoxy in macroeconomics. In this case one of us
￿Zambelli, [172] ￿has demonstrated, replicating exactly, the Frisch simulation
exercise, that the claims of orthodoxy are untenable. But that does not mean
the this classic can, in many senses, be considered the pioneering quantitative
contribution to simulation modelling in the sense in which we mean: studies of
disequilibrium paths by simulation exercises to learn and construct an appropri-
ate mathematical model of the macroeconomy, rather than the reverse process
of simply computing and con￿rming an analytical equilibrium and the formal
model for which it is a solution.
But we had to wait for the Stockholm School macroeconomists to initiate
the epistemological role for simulation in the construction of macroeconomic
theory as a study of the disequilibrium paths of aggregative variables in their
dynamics towards what may or may not be an equilibrium ￿even underpinned
by rational expectations and intertemporal accounting discipline.
Knut Wicksell￿ s ￿ second generation￿pioneer followers, and the founding fa-
thers of the Stockholm School approach to macroeconomic dynamics, primarily
Erik Lindahl, Gunnar Myrdal, Dag Hammarskj￿ld and Erik Lundberg, refused
to ￿ simplify￿their dynamic formulations in the interests of analytical solutions.
Instead, they opted to study copious numerical sequences62, based on ￿ realis-
tic￿parameter value ranges, which were, in their turn, assumed to be time-
varying, in general. Theirs was a disequilibrium dynamic approach to monetary
macroeconomics63, with impeccable economic theoretical foundations, but in-
vestigated ￿from an epistemological point of view - for their dynamic properties
by primitive simulation methods. Their refusal to adopt simplifying assumptions
in the interest of obtaining unambiguous analytical solutions was one of the main
causes of their ultimate demise from frontier macrodynamic research. Others,
more in tune with the zeitgeist, had no qualms about making the necessary
simplifying assumptions to obtain ostensibly general analytical solutions. This
hastened the demise also of their methodology for studying, from an epistemic
we are using the term, also his work on determining the parameters of political preference
functions ([41]). Although one of us has worked fairly intensively in this area (see [113]), we are
not sure that it satis￿es the unwritten rules of epistemology in the kind of simulation modelling
we have in mind. In other words, it was not quite a simulation study of a disequilibrium path.
62The almost ￿nal formal outline of this approach was summarized in chapter IX of Lund-
berg￿ s classic ([79]) and titled: The Construction of Model Sequences.
63Contrary to many popular statements and claims that Lindahl was wedded to a temporary
equilibrium approach, by the time he ￿Lindahl ￿came to present his mature vision of economic
dynamics as a General Process Analysis, he had dropped the earlier adherence to equilibrium
dynamics. That many commentators of Lindahl persisted in attributing to him an adherence
to equilibrium dynamics was due to an unfortunate historical accident. Myrdal￿ s trenchant
criticism of Lindahl￿ s method of temporary equilibrium, in the Swedish version of Monetary
Equilibrium ([90]) was excised in the English version of the book. This critique was fully
accepted by Lindhahl and he, then, completely revised his equilibrium methodology. The
immediate outcomes of these interactions were clearly evident ￿rst in Hammarskj￿ld￿ s doctoral
dissertation of 1933 and, ￿nally, in the above mentioned work by Lundberg and the ￿rst part
(written last) of Lindahl￿ s 1939 monograph (see, respectively, [89], particularly, f.n., 4, p. 205
& chapter III, § 22, [56], [79] and [76]).
39point of view, model sequences simulationally64. Had the computing capabili-
ties that are routinely available now been at their disposal, the pioneers of the
Stockholm School approach to macrodyamics could have stopped the slide into
the neoclassical synthesis and, thereby, heralded the advent of the DSGE model
and slide, of inherently indeterminate macroeconomics, into the neowalrasian
cloisters. This is a counterfactual claim. Whatever that may be, the fact is
that the rich simulation-strengthened macrodynamics of the Stockholm School
disappeared at the dawn of the computer era! Therefore, we will summarize our
story of the noble tradition of simulation in macroeconomics from the way digital
and analogue computing methods were harnessed to study the complex inde-
terminacies of the nonlinear disequilibrium dynamics of Keynesian aggregative
economics and the equally complex and equally indeterminate linear disequi-
librium dynamics of coupled economies, the latter leads to the quasi-periodic
paradoxes in the economic domain, as well.
5.1.1 The Place of Simulation and its Epistemology in the Keynesian
Macrodynamic Tradition
"No doubt there are many Kalecki E⁄ects walking about the world,
some of them dressed up in such grand mathematical clothes that
they are not likely to come my way. But I want to tell you about my
meeting, a year or two ago, with one of them who seemed a fairly
plain-spoken and approachable person."
Robertson, [109], p.188
There are many Keynesian traditions of disequilibrium macrodynamics ￿ walk-
ing about the world￿ , some even at the frontiers of economic theory, happily co-
existing with the rational expectations hypothesis and the shared equilibrium
norm of a long-run con￿gurations devised by the magicians and high priests in
the neowalrasian cloisters. We concentrate, instead, on variants of the original
multiplier-accelerator macrodynamics for a very simple reason: it is one of the
few dynamical systems, once widely used in economics, that is incapable of being
reconciled with any maximization disciplining rule. This makes it imperative
that one studies the properties of its ￿ transition￿path, towards an equilibrium,
whether it ever reaches it or not, whether the equilibrium can ever be charac-
terized or not. Indeed, even whether there is an equilibrium towards which it is
a transition path. One just studies the dynamics of a path ￿full stop.
The example we have chosen here encapsulates a noble tradition of simula-
tion in every sense of this concept: as a numerical method to study a precisely
speci￿ed mathematical system to be studied on a digital computer; as a sub-
stitute for an analytical study (because such a study is provably ￿ unlikely￿to
succeed in any meaningful way); as an epistemological tool to interpret the re-
sults (most of which were unexpected); and, above all, to gain insight into the
link between a computing machine and its theory and the theory of nonlinear
64The classic example of such a transmogri￿cation was the linearization of Lundberg￿ s piece-
wise linear ￿i.e., nonlinear ￿model of inventory ￿uctuations by Lloyd Metzler (cf. [153]).
40dynamical systems. The latter point is turning out to be the most signi￿cant
from the point of view of the epistemology of simulation, since the interaction
can only be explored by representing the one system by the other.
Consider the following equation, representing a classical Keynesian nonlinear
multiplier-accelerator model:
￿_ y (t) + (1 ￿ ￿)y (t) = ￿[_ y (t ￿ ￿)] + ￿ (t) + l(t) (1)
Where:
y (t): national income in real terms;
￿ : a constant with the dimension of years;
￿ : a dimensionless constant;
t : time in years;
￿ : a time lag in years;
￿ : the ￿ exible accelerator (either a smooth, elongated, s-shaped or a piece-
wise linear, elongated, z-shaped, curve);
l(t) : autonomous investment;
￿ (t) : autonomous component of consumption expenditure;
Now, there are at least four di⁄erent ways solutions to this equation has
been investigated:
￿ Graphically, i.e., in terms of the geometry of dynamic behaviour, as usually
done in the qualitative theory of di⁄erential equations (see[48]);
￿ By the method of equivalent linearization (see [10]);
￿ Using an electro-analog65 computer (see [132]);
￿ Using digital computers (see [173]);
Assuming, for example, ￿ (t) + l(t) a constant and reinterpreting y (t) as a
deviation from the unstable equilibrium of (1) (
￿(t)+l(t)
(1￿￿) ); one obtains a mixed
nonlinear di⁄erence-di⁄erential equation:
￿_ y (t + ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)y (t + ￿) = ￿[_ y (t)] (2)
In the ￿rst case, expanding (2) by a Taylor series approximation and retain-
ing only the ￿rst two terms, one obtained the famous (unforced) Rayleigh (- van








_ x + x = 0 (3)
65In parallel, but slightly earlier, work of a related nature, [131], p. 557, indicated the
nature of what they mean by ￿ analog￿ , in these contexts (italics added):
"If a single group of equations can be written which de￿nes the assumed perfor-
mance for two separate systems (each of which within itself represents an orderly
or de￿nable behavior), one system may be called the complete analogue of the
other."
41With this approximated reformulation Goodwin, geometrically, and Yasui
([167]) analytically, began an ￿ industry￿in the endogenous theory of the business
cycle! For the past six decades we have had variations on themes based on
(3), extending, generalizing, proving and simulating (digitally, of course), this
homogeneous equation in all sorts of ways. In all this activity all and sundry
seem to have forgotten the basic ￿nal form (1), of which (3) is a very special
approximation.
On the other hand, using an electro-analog computer, it was found, in [132],
that the approximation of (1) retaining the ￿rst four terms of a Taylor series
expansion, generated twenty-￿ve limit cycles, and a potential for a countable
in￿nity of limit cycles with further higher order terms included in the approx-
imations. Moreover, in its original formulation, one of the desired criteria for
the nonlinear formulation of the endogenous model of the business cycle, was
to generate self-sustaining ￿ uctuations, independent of initial conditions. This
latter property was lost when the approximation was made more precise. A
similar result was obtained in [163], this time using non-standard analysis to
study the dynamics of (3) ￿i.e., loss of independence of initial conditions in the
generated cycle(s) and the existence of many cycles.
The next ￿ assault￿on this obdurate equation was via coupled analog comput-
ers, where the coupling was between two economies. The coupling was of two
equations of type (3), via the Phillips Electro-Mechanical-Hydraulic Analogue
Computing Machine ([51]), which was shown to generate the quasi-periodic
paradox (cf., [1], above). Neither Goodwin, nor Phillips, who did the coupled-
dynamics simulation on the Phillips Machine had any clue ￿theoretical or other-
wise ￿about interpreting and encapsulating this outcome in any formalization.
The key point is that they were surprised by the outcome, which they did not
expect, and did not know how to interpret it when it emerged ￿exactly as in
the original FPU experiment. The analogies (sic!) are uncannily similar ￿es-
pecially from the point of view of the epistemology of simulation. There was
no macrodynamic theory to which they could relate the observed behaviour,
which was contrary to expected behaviour. In the case of the FPU paradox,
serendipitously, Kolmogorov￿ s conjecture of what was to become KAM theory
was announced that same year ￿the annus mirabillis, as we may now call it,
since the Goodwin-Phillips simulation exercise was also conducted that year ￿
195466.
Finally, one of us ￿Zambelli ([173] ￿repeated the simulation in [132], but
this time on a digital computer. Our aim was also to test the conjectures in
[45], regarding quasi-periodicity in coupled markets, but doing the simulation
for nonlinearly coupled economies, varying coupling strengths systematically.
Our results came as much of a surprise to us as every kind of FPU experiments
have been to their modellers: although we can con￿rm the results in [132], the
outcomes are richer and more varied and we would have no idea which way to
proceed, if we are wedded to an equilibrium norm to which the results have to
66As a matter of fact, it was also the year Simon ￿nalised the paper that is now considered
the fountainhead of classical behavioural economics (replete with simulation results), [123].
42conform. Instead, for the moment, we accept George Temple￿ s wisdom as our
practical precept ([139], p.233):
"The closely guarded secret of [the study of di⁄erential equations] is
that it has not yet attained the status and dignity of a science, but
still enjoys the freedom and freshness of such a pre-scienti￿c study
as natural history compared with botany. The student of di⁄erential
equations ￿signi￿cantly he has no name or title to rank with the
geometer or analyst ￿is still living at the stage where his main tasks
are to collect specimens, to describe them with loving care, and to
cultivate them for study under laboratory conditions. The work of
classi￿cation and systematization has hardly begun."
This is exactly what we are doing, ￿ collecting specimens, describing them
with loving care and cultivating them for study under laboratory conditions￿ ,
where to ￿ study under laboratory conditions￿means investigations by means of
simulations.
More than a lifetime ago, the prescient pioneer of the above Keynesian non-
linear dynamics, suggested that the study of coupled economic systems would
require ￿ the prolonged services of yet unborn calculating machines.￿ ([45], p.
204). We think Richard Goodwin, who for the geometric analysis of equation
(3) utilized ￿ paper and pencil simulation￿([25], p. 16; italics added), had the in-
tuition of a geometer to realise that coupled nonlinear dynamical systems would
prove to be impervious to formal analysis. He was the undisputed pioneer, also,
of ￿ collecting specimens, to describe them with loving care, and to cultivate them
for study under laboratory conditions.￿ ￿ We are simply standing on his shoulders,
and following in his footsteps. With his ￿ paper and pencil simulations￿he did
discover dynamical systems, inspired by economic intuitions, that the theorist of
nonlinear di⁄erential equations had not envisaged (see [47], and [156] for a brief
history of the discovery by means of ￿ paper and pencil simulation￿by Goodwin).
This is also the right place to point out that simulations are implementable
in very many di⁄erent ways, not just by means of classical digital and analogue
(or hybrid) computing machines.
In summary, the lesson we have learned from this tradition and our own
attempts at enriching it, is exactly similar to the one reported by Weissert￿ s
text on The Genesis of Simulation in Dynamics: Pursuing the Fermi-
Pasta-Ulam Problem, [165], particularly chapter 5: Steps to an Epistemology
of Simulation. For sixty-three years, macroeconomists outside the neowalrasian
cloisters have been investigating coupled dynamics in nonlinear systems, to the
best of their ability, using analogue and digital machines and discovering, via
simulations, dynamic behaviour that cannot be encapsulated by any economic
theory underpinned by any kind of maximization framework. Every experience
and every exercise in the traditions we have noted above is a challenge to the
absurd characterization by L&K: (p. 324)
"Simulations do not advance economic understanding since they can-
not correspond to argumentation patterns (perfect models) that con-
43stitute understanding."
Nothing done outside the neowalrasian cloisters ￿i.e., perfect models ￿can
￿ correspond to understanding￿ , despite evidence to the contrary. No wonder
they ￿L&K ￿think we, i.e, economists, have ￿ shunned simulations￿!
5.1.2 Varieties of Growth Theoretic Traditions
"Let me conclude ... with a brief allusion to two recent developments
in economic dynamics that can be taken to have some of their roots
in Lundbergian analysis. The ￿rst of these .... is the evolutionary
economics associated with the work of Nelson and Winter ([93]).
... In their valuable work, Nelson and Winter have proposed that a
fruitful alternative [to equilibrium analysis] can be found in dynamic
models, much of whose interest lies in their ability to provide rigorous
description of process of transition toward an equilibrium target that
may in fact never actually be attained. If that target continues to
shift, the nature of the transition path may encompass most of what
is really of interest in the formal analysis."
[6], p. 193; italics added.
The second of the ￿ two recent developments in economic dynamics￿to which
Baumol refers to in the above quote, is the Neo-Austrian analysis of traverse
dynamics via simulation models as in, for example, [2]. But there is a third
growth theoretic tradition, emerging from endogenous growth theory, grounded
squarely in recursion theory and analysable only by means of simulation! We
have called this the Computable Growth Theoretic Tradition (see [170] & [171]).
In each of these exercises in growth, the focus is on the path of growth, and
not on its (conceivable) end state. The approaches, and the stimulating and
inevitable epistemological role of simulation in their implementations, are ad-
equately ￿indeed in very great detail ￿presented in the four references given
above. Therefore, we shall not try to summarise or highlight any aspect of
evolutionary growth theory, traverse analysis or computable growth theory.
However, there are two issues that need to be pointed out: the ￿rst relates
to a characteristically uninformed point made by L&K, in the context of evolu-
tionary models and their place in simulation in the sense in which we mean it
(p. 312):
"The recent popularity of evolutionary game theory shows that econo-
mists do not shun simulation simply because it provides a way of
studying less-than-fully-rational decision-making rules."
But they fail to point out that this kind of evolutionary theory is as wed-
ded to equilibrium methodology as anything else in the neowalrasian cloister.
Moreover, if they want to give a proper example of an evolutionary theory, fully
independent of any and every rule of the neowalrasian code, they needed only
to refer to evolutionary growth theory, where, moreover, there is an explicit
44epistemological role for simulation. There is no evidence whatsoever that L&K
are even remotely aware of the existence of a ￿ ourishing ￿eld of evolutionary
growth theory ￿and has existed for over forty years!
The second point is more formal. Recall that our concern is the tradition
of simulation in economics whereby the focus is on the dynamics of a path,
independent of underpinning in orthodox rationality and equilibrium states.
In other words we are focusing on those traditions in economics that study, by
simulation models, the path and its properties, rather than states of equilibria or
the foundational rationality hypotheses. Now, consider the following de￿nition
and the ensuing proposition and theorem:
De￿nition 1 Dynamical Systems capable of Computation Universal-
ity:
A dynamical system capable of computation universality is one whose de￿n-
ing initial conditions can be used to program and simulate the actions of any
arbitrary Turing Machine, in particular that of a Universal Turing Machine.
Proposition 2 Dynamical systems characterizable in terms of limit points,
limit cycles or ￿ chaotic￿attractors, called ￿ elementary attractors￿ , are not ca-
pable of universal computation.
Proof. Essentially because the basin of attraction of such dynamical systems
are recursive.
Theorem 3 There is no e⁄ective procedure to decide whether a given observ-
able trajectory is in the basin of attraction of a dynamical system capable of
computation universality
Proof. The ￿rst step in the proof is to show that the basin of attraction of a
dynamical system capable of universal computation is recursively enumerable but
not recursive. The second step, then, is to apply Rice￿ s theorem to the problem
of membership decidability in such a set.
First of all, note that the basin of attraction of a dynamical system capable
of universal computation is recursively enumerable. This is so since trajectories
belonging to such a dynamical system can be e⁄ectively listed simply by trying
out, systematically, sets of appropriate initial conditions.
On the other hand, such a basin of attraction is not recursive. For, suppose
a basin of attraction of a dynamical system capable of universal computation
is recursive. Then, given arbitrary initial conditions, the Turing Machine corre-
sponding to the dynamical system capable of universal computation would be
able to answer whether (or not) it will halt at the particular con￿guration char-
acterizing the relevant observed trajectory. This contradicts the unsolvability
of the Halting problem for Turing Machines.
Therefore, by Rice￿ s theorem, there is no e⁄ective procedure to decided whether
any given arbitrary observed trajectory is in the basin of attraction of such recur-
sively enumerable but not recursive basin of attraction. Only dynamical systems
whose basins of attraction are poised on the boundaries of elementary attractors
are capable
45Claim 4 Only dynamical systems capable of computation universality
can generate behaviour that cannot be encapsulated in, or rationalised
by, any notion of maximization.
We believe we can prove this claim, but only by recourse to non-constructive
means. However, this claim shows exactly what is going on in an evolutionary
growth path, a traverse and in a computable growth path.
Next, consider the de￿nition of the Kolmogorov complexity of a ￿nite object
(Kolmogorov, 1968[[71]], p. 465) :
K￿ (yjx) = f
min￿(p;x)=y l(p)
1 @ p s.t ￿(p;x) = y
(4)
Where: ￿(p;x) = y : a partial recursive function or, equivalently (by the
Church-Turing Thesis), a Turing Machine ￿ the ￿ method of programming￿￿
associating a (￿nite) object y with a program p and a (￿nite) object x; the
minimum is taken over all programs capable of generating y, on input x, to the
partial recursive function,p. Consider the above (minimal) universal dynamical
system as canonical for any question about membership in attracting sets, A:
What is the complexity of KU (pjx)? By de￿nition it should be:
KU (yjx) = f
minU(p;x)=y l(p)
1 @ p s.t ￿(p;x) = y
The meaning, of course, is: the minimum over all programs, p; implemented
on U, with the given initial condition, x; which will stop at the halting con￿g-
uration, y:
Unfortunately, however, K￿ (yjx) is a non-recursive real number!
How can we decide, algorithmically, whether any observed trajectory is gen-
erated by the dynamics of a system capable of computation universality?
Consider the observable set of the dynamical system, y 2 A; given the UTM,
say U, corresponding to }.
The question is: for what set of initial conditions, say x, is y the halting state
of U. Naturally, by the theorem of the unsolvability of the Halting problem, this
is an undecidable question.
Remark 5 Why is it important to show the existence of the minimal program?
Because, if the observed y corresponds to the minimal program of the dynamical
system, i.e., of U, then it is capable of computation universality; if there is
no minimal program, the dynamical system is not interesting! A monotone
decreasing set of programs that can be shown to converge to the minimal program
is analogous to a series of increasingly complex ￿nite automata converging to a
TM. What we have to show is that there are programs converging to the minimal
program from above and below, to the border between two basins of attractions.
Shortly after Kolmogorov￿ s above paper was published, Zvonkin and Levin,
[?], p.92, Theorem 1:5;b; provided the result and proof that rationalises the basic
principle of the computable approximation to the uncomputable K￿ (yjx):The
signi￿cant relevant result is:
46Theorem 6 Zvonkin-Levin
9 a general recursive function H (t;x); monotonically decreasing in t, s:t :
lim
t!1H (t;x) = K￿ (yjx) (5)
Remark 7 This result guarantees, the existence of ￿ arbitrarily good upper esti-
mates￿for K￿ (yjx); even although K￿ (yjx) is uncomputable67.
But formally, at least, we can obviate the above result on the algorithmic
impossibility of inferring, from observable trajectories, whether they have been
generated by a dynamical system capable of computation universality. Thus, we
can try to approximate to the undecidable by a monotone computable process;
i.e., we can approximate to the dynamical system capable of computation uni-
versality by a sequence of observation on simpler dynamical systems. Unfortu-
nately, however, the melancholy fact noted in the last footnote may haunt the
empiricist forever!
The point of these formalisms is the following: the exercises in evolution-
ary growth theory, traverse analysis and computable growth theory are about
dynamical systems that are capable of computation universality. Such systems
possess strong and intuitive undecidability properties. Therefore, the scope of
analytical results are limited, at least with respect to traditional steady state
desiderata. Only simulation studies can give hints on possibilities for extract-
ing rules from observational behaviour ￿i.e., by traditional inductive methods.
However, they cannot be de￿nitive ￿as claimed by the plethora of agent-based
simulations, without a basis in computability theory.
5.2 Classical Behavioural Economics68
"The theory proclaims man to be an information processing sys-
tem, at least when he is solving problems. ......
An information processing theory is dynamic. ..
67Our view on this is further strengthened by some of the remarks in [20], particularly,
p.163, where one reads (italics added):
"The shortest program is not computable, although as more and more programs
are shown to produce the string, the estimates from above of the Kolmogorov
complexity converge to the true Kolmogorov complexity, (the problem, of course,
is that one may have found the shortest program and never know that no shorter
program exists).
These remarks border on the metaphysical! How can one algorithmically approximate to a
true value that which cannot be known algorithmically ￿by de￿nition?
68We have distinguished between classical and modern behavioural economics for many
years on the basis of a simple criterion: all of the behavioural assumptions made by Simon
and his closely associated pioneers of behavioural economics at its founding, were grounded in
a computational context. In the case of Simon, even more speci￿cally on computable grounds.
None of the behavioural assumptions of the modern variety, sometimes said to originate in
[142], are so grounded. The pioneers of classical behavioural economics are, in addition to
Herbert Simon, James March, Richard Nelson, Richard Day and Sidney Winter.
47The natural formalism of the theory is the program, which
plays a role directly analogous to systems of di⁄erential equations in
theories with continuous state spaces ... .
All dynamic theories pose problems of similar sorts for the
theorist. Fundamentally, he wants to infer the behavior of the sys-
tem over long periods of time, given only the di⁄erential laws of
motion. Several strategies of analysis are used, in the scienti￿c work
on dynamic theory. The most basic is taking a completely speci￿c
initial state and tracing out the time course of the system by ap-
plying iteratively the given laws that say what happens in the next
instant of time. This is often, but not always, called simulation, and
is one of the chief uses of computers throughout engineering and
science. It is also the mainstay of the present work.￿
Newell & Simon, [94], pp. 9-12; italics added.
We think there is common agreement in the economics profession that the
foundational, founding, works of behavioural economics are A Behavioral Model
of Rational Choice, [123], and its immediately succeeding companion piece,
[124], by Herbert Simon. The terminology, its computational underpinnings,
its concern with computational complexity, its setting in the framework of deci-
sion problems ￿in contrast to the orthodox setting in a maximizing framework
￿and, eventually, the incorporation of the satis￿cing metaphor, were all seeded
in that classic QJE piece. That Simon was working with underpinnings in com-
putability is easy to substantiate, if only one would take the time, and make
the e⁄ort, to read carefully his writings from about 1954 till right to the end
of his life. It can be inferred quite clearly and easily in two famous homages to
Alan Turing, one in Models of Man, [125], setting the scene for his monumental
work with Newell ([94]) on Human Problem Solving69, and the other in one
of his later important works, [126]. The ￿rst, in [125], was:
"But all of these e⁄orts [cybernetics and robot building] were rather
separate from simulation on the computer, which tended not toward
activating mechanical beasts but toward programming game playing
and other symbolic activities. ... And Alan Turing ([147]), in a justly
famous discussion, ￿ Computing Machinery and Intelligence,￿had put
the problem of simulation in a highly sophisticated form .... ."
69In very probably his last published paper before his tragic death in June, 1954, Turing
tackled, in a truly brilliant essay, the issue of Solvable and Unsolvable Problems, [148]. This
extraordinary essay, presaging the monumental work by Newell and Simon on Human Problem
Solving, was published in February, 1954 ￿ yet another of the serendipitous events of that
momentous year, 1954: ￿rst there was FPU, then, KAM, third, Bounded Rationality; fourth,
the coupled oscillator experiment on the Phillips Machine by Goodwin and Phillips, ￿nally,
this classic by Turing. In our forthcoming compendium on Computable Economics, [164],
pride of place is given to the computable underpinning of (human) problem solving by the
inclusion, in lead places, the above classic by Turing and [128]. Alas, all these serendipities
are blotted by the one undeniable tragedy of that year: the death, under tragic circumstances,
of Alan Turing.
48In the context of bounded rationality, satis￿cing, and their underpinnings
for the architecture of human thinking, it was the path broached by Turing
that guided Simon￿ s path-breaking contributions. In a volume celebrating ￿ The
Legacy of Turing￿([126], p.81 & p.101), Simon￿ s essay, Machine as Mind, began
and ended as follows:
"The title of my talk is broad enough to cover nearly anything
that might be relevant to a collection memorializing A.M. Turing.
... If we hurry, we can catch up to Turing on the path he pointed
out to us so many years ago."
In every ￿eld to which he contributed, economics, psychology, computer
science, philosophy of science and management science, simulation by digital
machines played a fundamental epistemological role ￿in discovering laws, in im-
plementing retroduction, in making induction scienti￿cally respectable. There is
no need for us to list the separate special areas of research, within the ￿ve disci-
plines just listed, in which he used, imaginatively and systematically, simulation
as an epistemological tool. All of this is amply documented in the primary and
secondary literature by and on Simon70. Even on the vast and impressive canvas
in which he sketched, developed and pioneered varieties of theories of: human
decision making, organizations and their evolving structures, evolution, models
of discovery, human problem solving, administrative behaviour and causality,
all of them investigated with imaginative ways of using simulation by digital
computers as experimental devices71 and conceptual tools, it is, in our opinion,
in the special contributions to human decision making, human problem solving
and devising laws of discovery, that simulation tools made their lasting and most
signi￿cant impact.
However, given the meaning we have given to simulation, in this work, and
following the brief formalization in the previous section, we will end this section
with a similar exercise, to substantiate our case for the role of simulation in adap-
tive behaviour, adaptive dynamics and adjustment processes in disequilibria, the
fulcrum around which all of classical behavioural economics was developed, all
underpinned by boundedly rational agents, searching for satisfying solution in
the context of decision problems (in the formal sense).
First of all, consistently with the framework of the previous section, we can
state a preliminary theorem:
Theorem 8 There is no e⁄ective procedure to decide, given any subset of an
iteration by a Dynamical System Capable of Computation Universality, whether
it is an equilibrating process.
70Our own contribution to this literature is detailed in the forthcoming monograph on
Simon, by Velupillai ([162]), Preliminary essays, leading up to this monograph, are, [159]
[161] and the chapters in Part IV of [160].
71Scholars who quote Simon rarely point out that he emphasized that his approach to human
problem solving, human behaviour and decision making, in particular, and to economics, in
general, was ￿ empirical, not experimental￿ . This, for Simon, simulation was a tool in the
domain of an empirical science, to be wielded the way a ￿ biochemist or archeologist￿would,
not in the way ￿ the agricultural experimenter￿would use it (see [94], pp. 12-13 and [127]).
49This does not necessarily mean that every ￿ time series￿ , generated by a Turing
Machine, if it is to be consistent with the rationality postulates of economic
theory, must be interpreted as a disequilibrium con￿guration. We can allow for
a third alternative ￿neither an equilibrium, nor a disequilibrium, process.
Now, let us assume the following (all of these can be formalized rigorously, as
we have done in related writings, in recent and not-so-recent papers and books):
(a) Adaptive processes will be assumed to be dynamical systems (in the
strict technical sense of the term);
(b) Dynamical systems capable of computational universality can be con-
structed from Turing Machines (TM);
(c) Rational behaviour by an economic agent is equivalent to the compu-
tational behaviour of a Turing Machine;
Then, we can state (and prove, if necessary), the following two theorems:
Theorem 9 Only adaptive processes capable of computation universality are
consistent with rationality ￿ in the sense that economist￿ s use that term￿ .
Theorem 10 There is no e⁄ective procedure to decide whether given classes of
decision rules are ￿ steady states of (some) adaptive process￿ .
To these we can add, ￿rst of all, that no dynamical system used in the
neowalrasian cloisters are capable of computation universality. Secondly, also
the following theorem:
Theorem 11 Boundedly rational choice by an information processing agent
within the framework of a decision problem is capable of computation universal-
ity.
Proof. See [161]
These formal results were derived by us to understand and substantiate
Simon￿ s lifelong adherence to simulation in its epistemological senses, and as a
tool in methodological modes.
The very idea that economists have shunned simulation can only crop up in
the heads of non-economists or those in the neowalrasian cloisters or those who
think ￿and there are surprisingly many ￿Simon was not an economist. And
that about a fellow of the Econometric Society and an economics Nobel Laure-
ate! What will philosophers think up next, to accuse economists of shunning ￿
perhaps computation, especially in its computable mode?
6 Melancholy Re￿ ections, Bright Hopes
"Every ￿nitely realizable physical system can be perfectly simulated
by a universal model computing machine operating by ￿nite means."
The Turing Principle - enunciated by David Deutsch ([28], p. 99).
50Deutsch enunciated the Turing Principle on the basis of a searching analysis
of the meaning of the Church-Turing thesis. He came to the conclusion that
underpinning the Church-Turing thesis there was a physical principle, which he
enunciated as the Turing Principle. Naturally, the Turing Principle, as given
above, requires a precise statement of what is to be meant by ￿ perfectly sim-
ulated￿ . Deutsch, being the serious scientist he is, did not forget to add a
de￿nition of ￿ perfect simulation￿(ibid, p. 99; italics added):
De￿nition 12 "A computing machine M is capable of perfectly simulating a
physical system S, under a given labelling of their inputs and outputs, if there
exists a program ￿(S) for M that renders M computationally equivalent to
S under the labelling. In other words, ￿(S) converts M into a ￿ black box￿
functionally indistinguishable from S."
We wonder whether a deeper knowledge of the frontiers of computability
theory ￿as well as a little of its history ￿may have prevented L&K from making
the many incorrect claims, from being slightly more precise about computation,
￿ perfect￿and ￿ black box￿ , and much else72.
Much of our discussion and critique of the claims in L&K has had as a back-
drop the precise theory of computation, which is underpinned by the Church-
Turing thesis. But we have also consciously adopted ￿although, we hasten to
add, only pro tempore73 ￿Deutsch￿ s important extensions, all of which seem
to be consistent with the stand taken also by Gandy ([42]), on the physical
principles that will have to be the basis on which the Church-Turing thesis is
interpreted in computability theory. Even though we worked with an informal
￿but, hopefully, precise ￿de￿nition of ￿ simulation￿and side-stepped the bland
references to ￿ black-boxes￿in L&K, our arguments above have been made with
the precise de￿nitions of Deutsch in mind. It is, therefore, just as well, we state
72Although it is becoming tiresome to catalogue the series of infelicities in L&K, we are
forced to add one further example, in view of the context of this concluding section. On
p. 311, L&K ￿ provide an example of the kind of research that [they] think could be more
common in economics: an agent-based simulation of a simple ￿nancial market￿ . They, then,
proceed to summarize the structure, assumptions and results of the paper to which they refer.
Unfortunately, they trip over the formal, analytic, part right at the beginning, by confusing
assumption with results - and worse. Moreover, the paper to which they refer is, essentially, a
￿nite automaton model of computation, which makes the interpretation of the results, given
in the original paper and by L&K, formally dubious. But correcting mistakes in references
used by L&K is not the one of the purposes of this paper. For, if so, we would have begun
with the absurd claim, in the ￿rst paragraph of the article by Hughes, on the contents of
The New Physics ([23]). Hughes states that the book contains only ￿ one entry on the topics
of computers and computer simulation￿ . Obviously he did not read chapter 6 by Malcolm
Langair, which is, in a way, a paean for ￿ computers and computer simulation￿in Astrophysics.
Moreover, this chapter is 115 pages long, about a ￿fth of the book￿ s total!
73This is partly because we are not completely convinced that the particular physical prin-
ciple Deutsch derives and states as the Turing Principle encapsulates entirely, for example,
Gandy￿ s Principles for Mechanisms. It is the latter that we have usually worked with and
have refereed to it as Gandy￿ s Principles for Mechanisms. Of course, this also requires a
precise de￿nition of simulation, but which turns out to be slightly more complicated and
lengthy to formulate than the admirably succinct de￿nition derived by Deutsch. A deep and
persuasive critique of Deutsch￿ s Turing Principle can be found in [143].
51them precisely, at this concluding stage. Interested readers, even ￿hopefully
￿inspired ones, may now want to go back and re-read our critique with these
precise de￿nitions in mind.
It is our belief, in this time and age, that economist with aims and ambitions
to construct models and theorize with mathematical tools, should be exposed
to the availability of a variety of mathematics and, correspondingly, di⁄erent
logical bases for them. To be taught mathematical economics as if real analysis
and set theory are the be all and end all is absurd, especially when the next step
is to use the mathematical models built on such foundations for computation by
a digital computer, which is based on wholly di⁄erent mathematical and logical
principles: constructive mathematics and proof theory, on the one hand; or the
theory of computation and recursion theory, on the other.
From our own experiences in teaching and interaction with colleagues, we
are painfully aware that economists are, in general, blissfully ignorant of any
notion of limits to computation, even with ideal machines. But even worse is
the equally blissful ignorance on the intrinsic limits to the results obtained with
real analysis, underpinned by set theory plus the axiom of choice, let alone the
impossibility of adapting such results, from such domains, for computation on
machines built on a wholly di⁄erent mathematics ￿even with the most rigorous
and careful notion of ￿ approximation￿(not the utterly loose and dangerously
irrelevant notion used in L&K).
Economists have never shunned simulation. However, they may have mis-
used it, perhaps due to a misunderstanding of the notion, nature and limits
of computation, even by an ideal machine. Engineers do not attempt to de-
sign perpetual motion machines that violate the laws of thermodynamics or
mechanics, although cranks, over the centuries, have claimed to have done so;
most of the models emanating from work in economic theory belong to The Mu-
seum of Unworkable Devices74 ￿at least when viewed from the vantage point
of constructive mathematics or recursion theory, i.e., from the point of view of
computation. How those in the neowalrasian cloisters make their unworkable
devices perform the tasks that need to be done, just for survival, is beyond our
commonsense comprehension. They must, together with L&K, live in illusions.
Surely, a strong case can be made for making economists, at least at the level
of graduate pedagogy, aware of The Museum of Unworkable Devices and The
Association for the Study of Failure (Shippai Gakkai)! An imposing catalogue of
unworkable devices and their failures can easily be composed, entirely out of the
products coming out of the neowalrasian cloisters, even without any mediation
from constructive mathematics or recursion theory.
More seriously, what are the main lessons to be learned from the infelicities
propagated by L&K? At the ground level, economists should be taught at least
the following, in conceptual and mathematical ways:
74See the illuminating website dedicated to The Museum of Unworkable Devices:
http://www.lhup.edu/~dsimanek/museum/
unwork.htm
52The Uzawa Equivalence theorem
The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem
The Ubiquity of Non-Maximum Dynamical Systems
The Church-Turing Thesis/Diagonalization
The Turing Principle/Gandy￿ s Principles for Mechanisms
The Turing Machine/Halting Problem
Computation Universality/Hilbert￿ s Tenth Problem
Kolmogorov Complexity/Algorithmic Randomness
Constructive Lawless Sequences
Decision Problems75 vs. Optimization Problems
Only common sense of a universal variety and the ability to think logically
￿preferably, but not necessarily, along the natural lines outlined by the Brouw-
erian Intuitionists - are required to understand, and work with, the above con-
cepts, all of which are elementary in a deep mathematical sense. We have never
found any advanced undergraduate or graduate student of reasonable maturity
to have had any di¢ culty whatsoever with understanding the case we make for
an economic theory framed in a mathematics that can handle these concepts.
Since an economic theory encapsulating the possibility of, say, a computation-
ally universal dynamical system, can only be explored by actual simulation ￿
￿ to collect specimens, to describe them with loving care, and to cultivate them
for study under laboratory conditions￿￿of the relevant system, it is natural for
such students to realize that there is a wholly di⁄erent world of economics than
the one peddled by the purveyors of the ideas and tools emanating from the
neowalrasian cloisters.
No one equipped with the above concepts and their mathematical and epis-
temological underpinnings would dream of thinking that bounded rationality is
some special subset of the economist￿ s notion of rationality ￿the quintessential
￿ unworkable device￿ . No one who understands the ubiquity of non-maximum
dynamical systems and understands the notion of computation universality
would try to anchor a norm in equilibrium dynamics. No student of economics,
equipped with these concepts, even at the level of nodding acquaintance, would
feel comfortable in the neowalrasian cloisters, itself located in Cantor￿ s Par-
adise. It may well be apposite to end this long and critical essay, remembering
the thoughts of two of the giants of 20th century mathematics and philosophy,
David Hilbert and Ludwig Wittgenstein:
75In the strict sense in which this is meant in metamathematics, computability and compu-
tational complexity theories (cf. [159]).
53Hilbert, [61], (p. 191): ￿ No one shall drive us out of the paradise
which Cantor has created for us.￿
Wittgenstein, [166], (p.103): ￿ I would say, "I wouldn￿ t dream
of trying to drive anyone out of this paradise." I would try to do
something quite di⁄erent: I would try to show you that it is not
a paradise ￿so that you￿ ll leave of your own accord. I would say,
You￿ re welcome to this; just look about you." ￿
We are doubtful, however, whether L&K have ￿ looked about them￿with
su¢ ciently critical minds and adequate knowledge of the history, theory and
practice of economics.
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